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R. George Wright*
I. INTRODUCTION
It turns out that persons are in various ways upgradeable. But what
if some formerly roughly equal persons are dramatically upgraded in
their basic capacities, while others are not? How should our most basic
law, in particular the principle of the equal protection of the laws,
control the phenomenon of unequal dramatic human enhancement? The
philosopher Rousseau famously took persons as they were, and on that
assumedly unchanging basis, considered dramatic changes in the basic
law.1  Current and future technological advances of various sorts,
however, raise an opposite and at least equally important question: if we
take the equal protection of the laws2 seriously, how should we react to
the prospect of a society eventually divided into dramatically enhanced
and unenhanced persons? 3 This Article takes up the latter question.
* Michael D. McCormick Professor of Law, Indiana University School of
Law Indianapolis. For variations of the title of this Article, see, e.g., Carl Elliott,
Humanity 2.0, available at http://www.genetics-and-society.org/resources/items
/200310_wilsonq-elliott.html; see also Anne Skare Nielson & Henrik S. Kristensen,
Humanity Version 2.0, available at http://www.cifs.dk/scripts/artikel.asp?id=616&lng-
2.
1. See JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 49 (Maurice Cranston
trans., Betty Radice & Rober Baldick, eds., Penguin Books 1968) (1762). But "[a]s our
powers over nature increase, we are bound to become less interested in what men are,
and more interested in what we make them to be." JOHN WILSON, EQUALITY 49
(Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. 1966).
2. Other elements of the Federal Constitution may well bear upon human
enhancement, particularly through genetic or other intimate means. For some examples,
see, e.g., Michael H. Shapiro, Does Technological Enhancement of Human Traits
Threaten Human Equality and Democracy? 39 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 769, 838-39 (2002)
(citing even the Constitution's Nobility Clause).
3. Reference to the ways in which technologically enhanced and unenhanced
persons are 'unequal' is of course not intended to suggest that enhanced persons are
worthier than unenhanced persons. Nor do we mean to deny that 'enhancement' is
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There are actually two reasons for addressing this question. First,
we may need all the lead time we have for thinking about how a society
of technologically enhanced and unenhanced 4 persons may be a
profoundly divided society, or may otherwise raise crucial problems of
equal protection. And second, it is certainly possible that thinking about
equal protection in extreme contexts to which we bring few
preconceptions can allow us to think more clearly about equal
protection itself, generally and in more familiar contexts.
In carrying out our inquiry, section II below introduces the
controversial distinction between therapy and enhancement and
introduces as well several possible forms of human enhancement.
Among these are human growth hormone and other advanced
pharmaceuticals, injectable muscle-growth factor, electroactive polymer
technology, brain and other body implants and their possible
connectivities, nanotechnology in several forms and the body, and
various genetic-based human enhancement techniques. A brief
introduction to some issues of consent and inequality, the changing
costs of enhancements over time, the breadth and depth of relevant
inequalities, and even of the possible breakdown of general solidarity
and commonality along caste-like lines, concludes the section.5
The following section III then pursues possible enhancement
technology cost-reduction. scenarios and their potential effects on
inequality, and more fully explores the ideas of equality and inequality
in the context of human enhancements. Equality and happiness or well-
being are distinguished, and the idea that equality is necessarily a
relative or comparative matter is introduced. Section III then illustrates
how human enhancement technology can blur traditional crucial
distinctions, including those between free if risky choice and sheer brute
luck; ambition-sensitive achievements versus a person's "mere"
endowment-based achievements; personal capacities versus one's
largely a cultural construct, or to rule out the possibility that some advanced forms of
human enhancement may carry dignitary costs or lead the enhanced persons into worse
choices than they might otherwise make.
4. The formula of enhanced and unenhanced persons is adopted here for the sake
of simplicity. However we wish to identify an enhancement, doubtless persons will be
enhanced or unenhanced as a matter of degree. This will be true with respect to overall
enhancement as well as enhancement along any specific dimension. While all persons
may be placed at one point or another on a continuum of enhancement, the same might
be said about wealth and poverty. This fact by itself hardly rules out social divisions
either between the extremely rich and the extremely poor, or between exceptionally
enhanced and unenhanced or minimally enhanced persons.
5. See infra section I1.
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circumstances or environment; natural or cosmic "injustice" and the
results of politics and economic systems; and even between transferable
and non-transferable "personal" assets. 6
Section III then notes the potentially crucial effects on future
descendants of an ancestor's free or unfree choices, including the
possible problems and benefits of a late adoption of enhancement
technology. The section concludes with specific consideration of"cumulativity" problems, in which various sorts of crucial inequalities
are jointly reinforced and compounded by the crucial enhancement
technologies.7
Section IV discusses several meanings, forms, and spheres of
equality and equal protection. Equal protection as impartial governance,
or as government distinctions drawn only on relevant grounds, sets the
stage for consideration of more elaborate equal protection theories
variously emphasizing anti-discrimination, anti-differentiation, anti-
subordination, and anti-caste principles. The distinction between
formalistic and substantivist approaches to equal protection is then
introduced 8 in the context of what amount to caste-like divisions
between technically enhanced and unenhanced persons.
The concluding section V pursues the above formalistic versus
substantivist equal protection distinction by addressing some well-
known Supreme Court equal protection cases. The cases illustrate,
respectively, what we will call a reductivist formalist approach to equal
protection; a rigorist formalist approach to equal protection; and, in our
context, a much preferable substantive realist approach to equal
protection. 9
Section V, and the Article as a whole, concludes with a specific
discussion of substantive realism in equal protection as applied in the
human enhancement context. Excessively intrusive solutions, as well as
tax or penalty-based solutions that focus unduly on 'leveling down,' as
opposed to 'leveling up,' should be rejected. Instead, the crucial
linkages between meaningful, substantively-understood equal protection
on the one hand and social commonality, genuine communication,
solidarity, and meaningful democracy on the other should be re-
affirmed.l°
6. See infra section III.
7. See id.
8. See infra section IV.
9. See infra section V.
10. See id.
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II. HUMAN ENHANCEMENTS AND THE FUTURE PROBLEMS OF EQUAL
PROTECTION
Few persons would prefer a society so severely divided into
technically enhanced and unenhanced "ordinary" persons that serious
issues of equal protection become inescapable. How, then, might such a
dramatically divided society arise? Many uncertainties must attach to
any scenario we can imagine. What seems technically unlikely today
may seem just the opposite tomorrow, and vice versa. It would be
foolish to place too much weight on the accuracy of any single scenario,
however vague, and however currently plausible.
Consider almost at random, then, this possible starting point:
injections of a human growth hormone drug have been made available
to unusually short children whose shortness of stature results not from a
shortage of their own natural growth hormone or from any disease. 1
The long-term treatments are available for boys likely to be shorter than
5'3" and girls likely to be shorter than 4'11" as adults. 2 The resulting
average gain in height is expected to be between 1.5 and 2.8 inches.' 3
Such current techniques already raise concerns, 14 even though the
results of the injections are not inheritable by the patient's future
descendants, and the purpose of the injections is to approach statistically"normal" height, rather than enhance an already statistically normal
characteristic.
Initially, the use of human growth hormone is thus in a sense
reducing an existing inequality, rather than creating or increasing an
inequality.' 5 And the inequality is being reduced by moving some,
though hardly all, of those in the bottom half of the distribution upward,
rather than by reducing anyone's height in the top half of the
distribution.
11. The Associated Press, A Hormone to Help Youths Grow is Approved by the
F.D.A., N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2003, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/27/science/27HORM.html (last visited July 27, 2003).
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. Only a limited number of short children are eligible for the treatment, and we
do not know whether they include many of the very shortest. This makes a difference,
as one could reasonably argue that moving persons other than the very shortest toward
the middle of the height distribution increases equality in a sense, but also increases
inequality, in that it increases the statistical isolation or "extremity" of the very shortest.
For discussion of a variety of similar problems, see LARRY S. TEMKIN, INEQUALITY
(Oxford Univ. Press 1993).
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Thus one could characterize the program as one of increasing
equality,' 6 and as therapeutic, or as "restorative" of some perceived
"deficiency." Holding this line, however, is likely to eventually prove
extremely difficult in practice. There may, in this example or in some
other kind of case, be no technical impediment 7 preventing similar
technology from increasing the height of an already tall child for
basketball scholarship purposes.1 8 Other tall children with competitive
1 9
parents, after all, may already be receiving treatments, or at least be
rumored to. In the face of sometimes reluctant parental demand,
murky conceptual distinctions,21 and practical enforcement problems,22
the line between therapy and enhancement, even if it is clear in some
23theoretical sense, may not be maintainable in practice. Maintaining
16. But cf. id.
17. See Mark S. Frankel, Inheritable Genetic Modification and a Brave New
World: Did Huxley Have It Wrong? 33 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 31, 33-34 (2003)
("the technology developed for therapeutic purposes will be the same as that used for
enhancement"). As well, even "distinguishing between treatment and enhancement may
get increasingly difficult." Id. at 34.
18. See id.
19. While some qualities are useful mainly to the extent that other persons do not
possess them to the same degree, others, such as human resistance to disease, are of
value even if-or especially if-they are also possessed by others. The collectively self-
defeating sorts of enhancements are discussed in ALLEN BUCHANAN ET AL., FROM
CHANCE TO CHOICE: GENETICS AND JUSTICE 182-87 (2000).
20. See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 17, at 34 (discussing parental affection, concern,
and ambition on behalf of their children); Jason C. Glahn, I Teach You the Superman:
Why Congress Cannot Constitutionally Prohibit Genetic Modification, 25 WHITTIER L.
REv. 409, 437 (2003) ("[c]ritics might claim that the government has additional interests
such as an egalitarian desire to prevent the growth of a genetic gap .... The response to
such arguments is ... [that] [t]here is no historical pedigree and no case law that
establish such countervailing interests as serious challenges to the rights of parents").
21. See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 17, at 34. Even if the distinctions at issue could
be clarified, it is far from clear that after the unfamiliarity wears off, along with any
sense of "unnaturalness," much of the public will draw principled distinctions among
traditional orthodontics as therapy, cosmetic dental implants; orthodontics beyond mere
therapy; or creating more attractive teeth by non-threatening genetically-based means.
This is not to say that the public will want to subsidize all of the above, or will want
them all treated the same for government or private insurance purposes.
22. See, e.g., Lee M. Silver, Reprogenetics: Third Millennium Speculation, 1
EUROPEAN MOLECULAR BIOLOGY ORG. REPORTS 375, 378 (2000) ("the innate desire to
advantage one's children is so powerful that affluent citizens may buy reprogenetics
elsewhere even if their society bans or limits it use-just as Europeans now travel to the
USA to purchase human eggs from selected donors"). Of course, some imaginable
illegal "upgrades" may be readily proven to be illegal.
23. See, e.g, Frankel, supra note 17, at 34; Jon W. Gordon, Genetic Enhancement
in Humans, 283 SCIENCE 2023 (March 26, 1999) (referring to "the general belief that
voluntary abstention from germ line modifications in humans is unlikely"); Leon R.
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the line will be even more difficult when enhancements more crucial
and more socially valuable than height, such as disease resistance, bone
strength, or various general mental abilities are at stake.24
We should expect similar reactions, once the shock of novelty
wears off, to other enhancement technologies. Admittedly, some such
technologies may be collectively self-defeating,25 or may even
undermine the interest value of the activity in question, as perhaps in the
case of some sports performance enhancers. But if a technology can
26 27enhance competitive performance, at an acceptable risk of detection
or of serious medical side effects, we may expect its use as long as the
stakes are sufficiently high.
One possible such technique, developed originally as a therapeutic
treatment for muscle-wasting disease or for muscles weakened through
28advanced age, may also benefit competitive athletes at any level. The
particular technique "uses a gene for insulin-like growth factor which
when injected with a virus into a muscle becomes incorporated into the
genes of the muscle tissue causing them to grow., 29 For the particular
technique in question, only one injection may be necessary,3' but the
actual enhancement effects on already healthy muscle tissue remain to
be definitively established,3' and potentially serious adverse health
effects clarified.3 2
Kass, The Moral Meaning of Genetic Technology, 108 COMMENTARY 32 (Sept., 1999)
(recognizing the practical indefensibility of a line not only between gene therapy on
existing people and germ-line modification, but between gene therapy and genetic
enhancement) (asking rhetorically in particular "will we deny prospective parents the
right to enhance the potential of their children?"); Mark A. Hall, Genetic Enhancement,
Distributive Justice, and the Goals of Medicine, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 669, 674-78
(2002) (discussing the therapeutic versus enhancement distinction).
24. See Kass, supra note 23 (discussing examples of such possibilities).
25. See supra note 19. An enhancement that merely allows one to, by loose
analogy, stand up to see better at a football game loses its value entirely if all or most
other spectators in front have also purchased the same enhancement, so that most or all
of the crowd is standing, but now enjoying no better view than formerly.
26. See, e.g., Steven Connor, Gene Therapy Could Help Athletes Cheat, at
http://news.independent.co.uk/low-res (February 17, 2004). For a sense of the shifting
non-genetic baseline, see Allan H. "Bud" Selig & Robert D. Manfred, Jr., The
Regulation of Nutritional Supplements in Professional Sports, 15 STAN. L. & POL'Y
REv. 35 (2004).
27. See supra note 26.
28. See id.
29. Id.
30. See id.
31. See supra note 26. The same investigator, Dr. H. Lee Sweeney, has produced
dramatic and long-term muscle effects in mice. "The mighty mice looked like a
different animal. They were built like cattle with thick necks and big haunches. They
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It is important at this point to remember that our equal protection
argument does not rely on any single scenario or any single kind of path
to human enhancement. The genetic injection into muscle technique
doubtless has risks and limits of various sorts, even when refined or
combined intelligently with other enhancement techniques of far
different sorts. Nor can we even begin to tell which specific
enhancement techniques have the most dramatic long-term potential,
alone or in combination, or which sorts of obstacles will prove either
lesser or greater than they currently seem.
Merely as one alternative, then, we might briefly consider the
possibility of electroactive polymers as a route to, or substitute for,
enhanced arm strength. In particular, Yoseph Bar-Cohen of the NASA
Jet Propulsion Laboratory has issued a challenge to construct a non-
metallic robotic arm,33 of arm-wrestling strength, composed of
electroactive polymers capable of bending, flexing, contracting, and
twisting in response to electric charges.34 While it is unlikely that many
persons of ordinary strength would be disposed to swap their familiar
sorts of limbs for polymer limbs of roughly equal capacity, it is less
easy to rule out our adopting some further more sophisticated
development of this technology, in some contexts.
More dramatic are the technical and the equal protection
implications of future generations of brain and other sorts of body
implants.35 With some sorts of advanced brain implants may come
belonged in some kind of mouse rodeo." Michael Sokolove, The Lab Animal, (2004), at
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/18/magazine/18SPORTS.html. For further discussion,
see H. Lee Sweeney, Gene Doping, 291 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN 62 (July 2004). For a
loose "natural" genetic analogue, see Gene Mutation Makes Tot Super Strong,
CNN.com (June 24, 2004) at http://cnn.com/HEALTH (inherited DNA segment blocks
production of the protein myostatin that would limit muscle growth; uncertainty as to
any future health problems), as well as the more technical discussions of Elizabeth M.
McNally, Powerful Genes-Myostatin Regulation of Human Muscle Mass, 350 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 2642 (June 24, 2004) and Markus Schuelke, et al., Myostatin Mutation
Associated With Gross Muscle Hypertrophy in a Child, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2682
(June 24, 2004).
32. See Connor, supra note 26 (potential risks could include "increased heart
problems and possibly cancer").
33. See Cari Beth Head, Meet the Artificial Muscle Man, (2003), at
www.cnn.com/2003/TECHIptech/10/09/popsci.muscle.man.
34. See id.
35. See Justin Pope, FDA Approves Human Brain Implant Devices, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, at http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl-story&u-/ap/20040413/ (Cyber-
Kinetics firm of Foxboro, Mass. beginning clinical trials of implanted four square
millimeter chips conceivably at some point allowing persons "to command a computer
to act-merely by thinking about the instructions they wish to send"). For a much
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extremely efficient and powerful interfaces between brains and external
computers.3 6 Consider a possible future in which a few or even a
majority, but not all, adults are able, through some combination of
advanced technologies, to process information with the speed of today's
Google, but with far greater incisiveness, focus, discretion, judgment,
and practical wisdom. The remainder of the adult population, the
unenhanced, would realistically be in no position to compete for the
corresponding number of appealing jobs, or for genuine political and
economic influence.
Human capacities may be dramatically upgradeable through a
variety of other technologies, some genetically focused, and others not
genetically focused. One possibility of the latter variety lies in
incorporating sophisticated nanotechnology, perhaps in the form of
nanobots, or robots on an extremely small physical scale, into human
functioning. The idea has been raised, for example, that "[i]nstead of
having red and white blood cells floating through your veins, some 500
trillion... nanobots would fill the entire vasculature of the body, some
lining the blood vessels and some swarming through them. 3 7 Again,
and especially in combination with advanced genetic or other
technologies, there arises the possibility of increasing basic inequalities
if such technologies are not adopted universally.
broader, deeper, and more speculative excursion along these developing lines, see ANDY
CLARK, NATURAL-BORN CYBORGS: MINDS, TECHNOLOGIES, AND THE FUTURE OF HUMAN
INTELLIGENCE (2003).
36. See the sources cited supra note 35.
37. James M. Pethokoukis, Roboblood, U.S. NEWS.COM (Aug. 8, 2003), at
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/nycu/teeh/nextnews/archive/next03808.htm (raising
the prospect of not only disease prevention, but of "significantly improving physical
endurance and stamina," along with greater resistance to accident and injury). For some
initial exploration of possible risks of some similar uses of nanotechnology, see Rick
Weiss, For Science, Nanotech Poses Big Problems, THE WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 2004
("nanoparticles can make their way from a rat's throat into its brain, apparently through
the nasal cavities and olfactory bulb"). For a broader overview of possible problems
and prospects of human enhancement through nanotechnology, see, e.g., STEPHEN
WOOD FT AL., THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHALLENGES OF NANOTECHNOLOGY
(Economic & Social Research Council 2003). For some possible lines of convergence
or symbiosis between nanotechnology and advanced forms of pharmaceuticals, see, e.g.,
Zack Lynch, Think Nano Has Ethical Problems? Just Wrap Your Brain Around Neuro,
at http://www.smalltimes.com/document -display.cfm?documentid=7522 (July 7,
2004) (discussing competitive advantages potentially available through advanced"neuroceuticals"); Jack Mason, Melding of Nano, Bio, Info and Cogno Opens New
Legal Horizons, at http://www.smalltimes.com/document-display.cfm?document
_id-7501 (July 7, 2004) (neuroceuticals as the future anticipated result of "biochips and
brain imaging").
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Increasing inequalities in basic capacities can take the form of
expensively preventing familiar forms of disease. Invulnerability to
some forms of disease or accident may become an important advantage.
Thus some enhancements may preclude bad possibilities, while others
may promote positive achievements. Neither form of enhancement can
be without risk. Some enhancements may prove to be only expensive
routes to results achievable by less expensive means. Others may have
severe adverse side effects, by themselves or when combined with other
technologies. Some forms of enhancement may have insufficient payoff
to cover their purchase costs. Of course, other technologies of
enhancement may develop fewer serious problems than anticipated, or
may even operate synergistically with other enhancement technologies.
Prices and practical limits may surprise us, favorably or unfavorably,
and they may change over time at surprising rates.
The prices of enhancements, and the rates at which those prices
change, will be important to the severity of the related inequalities, and
to questions of equal protection of the law. Nanotechnology in general
has already been cited as a possible future source of increasing
inequalities between rich and poor,38 assuming differences between
higher and lower income persons in their realistic access to such
technology. 39
Even more intriguing are the problems posed by various kinds of
genetic enhancements.40 On its face, the idea of inheritable genetic 41
enhancement seems to open possibilities that are broader, more
dramatic, and more profound than do other forms of human
enhancement.42  Potentially, genetic enhancements, perhaps in
combination with other forms of enhancements, could lead not only to
utterly caste-like inequalities, but even beyond caste to social and
38. See WOOD ET AL., supra note 37, at 34.
39. See id.
40. See, e.g., Michael J. Sandel, The Case Against Perfection, 293 ATLANTIC
MONTHLY 51 (April, 2004); Michael J. Sandel, What's Wrong With Enhancement? THE
PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS (2002), at
http://www.bioethics.gov/background/sandelpaper.html.
41. While our focus will be on inheritable genetic enhancements, not all genetic
alterations, in a broad sense, are inheritable. "[A]ny genetic changes to somatic cells
cannot be passed onto future generations. Changes, on the other hand, to germ-line cells
can indeed be passed onto children and to succeeding generations." MICHAEL J. REISS &
ROGER STRAUGHAN, IMPROVING NATURE?: THE SCIENCE AND ETHICS OF GENETIC
ENGINEERING 202 (1996).
42. See the sources cited supra note 40.
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biological partition, unbridgeable separation, and civic unconnectedness
among groups and generations.
This is not to suggest that the path to the successful technical
development and public availability, legal or illegal, of genetic
enhancements will be smooth. Certainly, we will not be able to unscrew
a single gene governing any valuable quality and replace that gene with
a uniformly better single gene, at little, biological cost. Consider the
strictures of a contemporary philosopher:
[E]ven if we could isolate specific genes that are associated with gifts such as
musicality (which we cannot) . .. this [would] be insufficient to secure their
successful replication. Were we to locate such a thing, its isolation and
insertion would be a hazardous undertaking, with quite unpredictable results.
The interrelations of genes are simply too complex to make plausible efforts
of this kind. Besides, we know that DNA is not the only agent in biological
development .... The aspiration to designer babies, then, is an impossible
dream .... 43
Nor can we always expect to control genetic influences on human
capacities by focusing very narrowly on genes themselves. The
influence of what we think of as genetics may actually be partly a matter
of interactions 44 between genes and environment. Genes may
themselves respond to,45 and alter their functioning in response to,
46
their nurture or environment.
43. GORDON GRAHAM, GENES: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 173 (2003). See also
Nicholas Wade, Should We Improve Our Genome?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2003, at
Science Times section, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/1 l/science/IIGENO.html ("many genes have more
than one effect, and swapping out the bad version of a gene can have unpredictable
complications. The new gene, for example, may interact badly with the person's other
genes").
44. See, e.g., Rick Weiss, Gene's Sway Over IQ May Vary With Class, THE WASH.
POST, Sept. 2, 2003, at Al ("the emerging view allows that genes can influence the
impact of experiences and experiences can influence the 'expression,' or activity levels,
of genes").
45. See, e g., Sandra Blakeslee, A Pregnant Mother's Diet May Turn the Genes
Around, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2003, at Fl, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/07/science/07GENE.html ("a mother's diet can
permanently alter the functioning of genes in her offspring without changing the genes
themselves").
46. H. Allen Orr, What's Not In Your Genes: Review of Matt Ridley, Nature Via
Nuture: Genes, Experience, and What Makes Us Human, 50 N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Aug. 14,
2003, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/16522 ("study of the human
genome has revealed that genes respond to experience").
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These sorts of complications, however, are for our purposes
inessential. If safe and valuable genetic enhancements become
available, some parents, perhaps after a period of desensitization, will
embrace or feel competitively bound to embrace 47 such technologies.
The moral controversiality of such technologies, 48 and even their legal
prohibition within a given jurisdiction,49 may not be of decisive
weight.50
47. The philosopher Jonathan Glover has noted that some adoptions of genetic
technology might not be entirely free. Glover notes that "parents might think their
children would be more successful if they were more thrusting, competitive, and selfish.
If enough parents acted on this thought, other parents with different values might feel
forced into making similar choices to prevent their own children being too greatly
disadvantaged." JONATHAN GLOVER, WHAT SORT OF PEOPLE SHOULD THERE BE?:
GENETIC ENGINEERING, BRAIN CONTROL AND THEIR IMPACT ON OUR FUTURE WORLD 49
(1984).
48. Generalized moral critique of genetic enhancements is beyond the scope of our
concern. For some of the most interesting and to this point influential, see, e.g., the
sources cited supra note 40; LEON R. KASS, LIFE, LIBERTY AND THE DEFENSE OF
DIGNITY: THE CHALLENGE FOR BIOETHICS (2002); JURGEN HABERMAS, THE FUTURE OF
HUMAN NATURE 61 (2003) ("[e]ugenic programming of desirable traits and
dispositions ... gives rise to moral misgivings as soon as it commits the person
concerned to a specific life-project or ... puts specific restrictions on his freedom to
choose a life of his own") (producing a relationship based on paternalism rather than
communication and reappraisal); REISS & STRAUGHAN, supra note 41, at 222 ("[ilt can
be argued that genetic engineering to enhance human traits diminishes the autonomy of
the... genctically engineered child that results"); C.S. LEWIS, THE ABOLITION OF MAN
57 (Harper 2001) (1944) (use of such techniques as disempowering both the object-
generation and preceding generations); ONORA O'NEILL, THE 'GOOD ENOUGH' PARENT
IN THE AGE OF THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES, IN THE ETHICS OF GENETICS IN
HUMAN PROCREATION 33, 43 (Hille Harker & Deryck Beyleveld cds., 2000) (raising the
possibility of a new pattern of contingent parental commitment to offspring, dependent
upon parentally anticipated performance levels); REISS & STRAUGHAN, supra note 41, at
221 (discussing John Mackie's argument that "if the Victorians had been able to use
genetic engineering, they would have aimed to make us more pious and patriotic"). For
interesting predictions on how genetic enhancements are likely to be used, see James
Hudson, What Kinds of People Should We Create?, 17 J. APPLIED PHIL. 131 (2000).
The above considerations pose general moral problems. We also set aside more
specialized moral problems, such as those stemming from the creation of chimeras
consisting of hybrids of humans and some other species. For discussion, see Nicholas
Wade, Stem Cell Mixing May Form Human-Mouse Hybrid, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2002,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/1l/27/science/27CELL.html (discussing
various exotic possibilities); DERYCK BEYLEVELD & ROGER BROWNSWORD, HUMAN
DIGNITY IN BIOETHICS AND BIOLAW 164-66 (2001) (discussing the possible roles of
sentience and agency in ascribing full moral status); Nicole E. Kopinski, Human-
Nonhuman Chimeras: A Regulatory Proposal On the Blurring of Species Lines, 45 B.C.
L. REV. 619 (2004). See also Rick Weiss, Of Mice, Men and In-Between, WASHINGTON
POST, Nov. 20, 2004, at Al.
49. See, e.g., LEE M. SILVER, REMAKING EDEN: How GENFTIC ENGINEERING AND
CLONING WILL TRANSFORM THE AMERICAN FAMILY 284 (1998) (assuming the practical
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It is possible that genetic enhancement may raise no serious equal
protection issues over the long term. In the meantime, we could
certainly use genetic enhancement scenarios to increase our
understanding of what equal protection really requires. This optimistic,
and certainly controversial, perspective can take something like the
following form:
Almost every medical advancement at its beginning was available only to the
rich. By refining these advancements and techniques prices dropped which
opened up new markets for those less financially fortunate. In the end,
procedures that were once cost prohibitive are now available to everyone.
There is no reason to think that genetic enhancement procedures won't follow
the same course.
Or, as Professor Michael H. Shapiro controversially argues,"suppose that enhancement becomes legal, its use disclosed, its price
relatively low, and its efficacy roughly the same for all. Then, whatever
objections would remain, inequality concerns would be partially muted,
unenforceability of significant legal restrictions on genetic enhancements generally);
Lee M. Silver, Reprogenetics: Third Millennium Speculation, 1 EUROPEAN MOLECULAR
BIOLOGY ORG. REPORTS 375, 378 (2000) ("the innate desire to advantage one's children
is so powerful that affluent citizens may buy reprogenetics elsewhere even if their
society bans or limits its use-just as Europeans now travel to the USA to purchase
human eggs from selected donors"); Maxwell J. Mehiman, The Law of Above Averages:
Leveling the New Genetic Enhancement Playing Field, 85 IOWA L. REV. 517, 565-68
(2000). See Mehlman, supra, at 566 ("[slimilar to the War on Drugs and the effort to
ban drugs in sports, restricting access to genetic enhancements to promote equality is
likely to be extremely intrusive and expensive. Moreover, it is likely that a ban will not
be completely effective"). We would expect the illegality of any valuable enhancement
to tend to increase its price, which in turn may worsen the effect of such an
enhancement on inequalities among persons.
50. In general it seems possible that a technique legally available for deficiency-
preventive or deficiency-curative purposes may also tend, perhaps at higher doses, to
promote extraordinary capability in other persons. Consider, perhaps, a next generation
prescription drug intended to treat deficiencies of memory, or concentration, or even the
ability to draw deductive inferences, that can be adapted to enhance statistically normal
abilities as well. See, e.g., Mehlman, supra note 49, at 566.
51. Adam D. Moore, Owning Genetic Information and Gene Enhancement
Techniques: Why Privacy and Property Rights May Undermine Control of the Human
Genome, 14 BIOETHICS 97, 117 (2000). But see the less optimistic, less egalitarian
scenario envisioned in MAXWELL J. MEHLMAN & JEFFREY R. BOTKIN, ACCESS TO THE
GENOME: THE CHALLENGE TO EQUALITY 88 (1998) (noting the likely unavailability for at
least some time of insurance coverage, due either to high costs or the experimental
nature of enhancements).
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though remaining important because of enduring positional
differences. 5
2
Even Professor Shapiro's scenario thus assumes ongoing important
problems of inequality. And some especially valuable technologies may
remain at prices out of the reach of at least some small portion of the
society for a length of time sufficient to confer a permanent and
growing advantage on early adopters. 3
Among the moderate optimists is the well-known public affairs
writer Francis Fukuyama. 54 Fukuyama recognizes the possibility of "the
emergence of new genetic classes."55 But he also sees a more positive
outcome as "entirely plausible. 56  This outcome would involve "an
impetus toward a much more genetically egalitarian society."5 7
Crucially, though, Fukuyama does not see this egalitarian outcome
as arising from the unregulated play of the relevant markets, including
insurance markets, or from some irresistible technological imperative
governing prices and availability. Fukuyama instead argues that "it
seems highly unlikely that people in modem democracies will sit around
complacently if they see elites embedding their advantages genetically
in their children." 58 This seems to imply some sort of aggressively
52. Michael H. Shapiro, Does Technological Enhancement of Human Traits
Threaten Human Equality and Democracy?, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 769, 807 (2002).
53. It is also possible that in some cases, the price of new technology-covered by
insurance or otherwise subsidized or not-could decrease so fast, and the quality and
power of the technology could increase so fast that it would actually be the early
adopters who lose ground to late adopters. This could be especially significant if the
particular technology, once adopted, is difficult or risky to upgrade or replace with more
advanced versions.
54. See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, OUR POSTHUMAN FUTURE: CONSEQUENCES OF THE
BIOTECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION 158 (2002).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. FUKUYAMA, supra note 54, at 158. It is important to remember that
competitive pressure to ensure that one's children are enhanced, whatever one takes the
medical risks or the moral costs to be, amounts to a real limitation, in some sense, on
parental freedom. See ALLEN BUCHANAN ET AL., FROM CHANCE TO CHOICE: GENETICS
AND JUSTICE 185 (2000) (noting that some parents may want children of at least average
intelligence, and view the enhancements necessary to reach the new average dictated by
enhanced children as requiring a risky or costly choice). For a review of Allen
Buchanan et al., see Mark A. Hall, Genetic Enhancement, Distributive Justice, and the
Goals of Medicine, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 669 (2002). Not all parents need accept the
predominant understanding of what constitutes a genuine 'enhancement,' at least for
their own children. Some parents may prefer 'disenhancement' for their offspring,
given their own values and circumstances. See, e.g., Martin Harvey, Reproductive
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demanded public policy redress, perhaps even culminating in
meaningful judicial decisions on genetic class disparities and the equal
protection of the laws. Indeed, Fukuyama may even envision popular
agitation and direct action in this regard well beyond tranquil
democratic politics. 59
Issues of free and knowledgeable consent by or on behalf of all the
affected parties would inevitably arise. Some parents who could afford
various sorts of dramatic enhancements for their current or future
offspring may choose against such enhancements, 60 perhaps on
sophisticated ethical or other philosophical grounds. 61 To the extent,
though, that parents reject such enhancements out of demonstrable
ignorance, irrational fear, or lack of freedom, more serious problems of
equal protection would remain. Any equal protection problems would
in an important sense be worsened if the poor and unenhanced as a class
were somehow taught to delight in their condition.62
Equally disturbingly, the parental choice for unenhanced offspring
might, depending upon the technology, effectively seal the inferior
status of such offspring. It is possible that, at least for the offspring's
generation and perhaps for their own successors, the offspring's status
inferiority could not be reversed even if the offspring so preferred. In
such cases, the offspring would lack meaningful freedom and equality in
the relevant respects. 63
In general, the gap between genetically enhanced persons and
persons not thus enhanced-"naturals"--could eventually pose equal
protection problems of unprecedented depth and severity. The gap
Autonomy Rights and Genetic Disenhancement: Sidestepping the Argument from
Backhanded Benefit, 21 J. APPLIED. PHIL. 125 (2004).
59. See FUKUYAMA, supra note 54, at 158 ("this is one of the few things in a
politics of the future that people are likely to rouse themselves to fight [perhaps even
literally, in the sense of recourse to "guns and bombs"] over).
60. See, e.g., Nick Bostrom, Human Genetic Enhancements: A Transhumanist
Perspective, 37 J. VALUE INQUIRY 493, 503 (2003).
61. See, e.g., the concerns raised by Professor Michael Sandel, supra note 40.
62. For the extreme case of conflict-reducing, systematic, and explicit class-based
indoctrination and conditioning, see ALDOUs HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (Harper &
Row 1946) (1932).
63. See, e.g., GREGORY STOCK, REDESIGNINci HUMANS: CHOOSING OUR GENES,
CHANGING OUR FUTURE 191 (2003) ("many parents might shun [germinal choice
technology], but others would embrace it enthusiastically. With time, people's genetics
would become a manifestation of their parents' values and predilections"). At greater
length, but with a different focus as well, see Eric Rakowski, Who Should Pay For Bad
Genes?, 90 CAL. L. REv. 1345 (2002) (discussing, among other proposals, a compulsory
insurance-based scheme to provide compensation to genetically disadvantaged
children).
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could well become not merely a genetic gap, but a gap in every other
economically and politically relevant respect as well.64 The distances
between enhanced and unenhanced persons, in socioeconomic terms,
might well become "enlarged and less bridgeable. 65  Under such
circumstances, it would not be unreasonable to characterize the eventual
separation between enhanced and unenhanced as a "chasm ' 66 or as
societal fragmentation.67
Descriptions such as of a gulf or chasm between more or less
discrete groups, or of societal fragmentation, raise serious equal
protection clause concerns on their face. But there is even more serious
cause for concern where an unbridgeable gulf comes to amount to a
genuine "partitioning. ' 68 The existence of inequality, and perhaps even
of severe inequality in one respect or another, is one thing. But the
existence of severe and across the board, mutually reinforcing,
realistically unbridgeable and "unassailable ' '69 privilege and inequality
is even worse.
What of the subjective bonds that help to unify a healthy society?
Would empathy and identification long unify groups that have become
remarkably different in their most basic capacities? The idea of a"shared humanity"70 or of a connectedness to "humanity as a whole, ' 71
within or beyond national borders, might well be eventually
jeopardized.
At the extreme, it is possible to imagine that two discrete groups,
one of which is able to pass along remarkable genetic enhancements-
perhaps even automatically self-enhancing genetic enhancements-
might eventually form two distinct subspecies.72 We can imagine
constitutional policies that seek to promote the best interests of both the
enhanced and the unenhanced as separate actual subspecies. But to say
64. See SILVER, supra note 49, at 285.
65. Shapiro, supra note 52, at 809.
66. STOCK, supra note 63, at 140.
67. See id. See also MEHLMAN & BOTKIN, supra note 51, at 99 ("division of
society into a genetic aristocracy and a genetic underclass would have momentous
consequences... for democratic society .... It would undermine the fundamental
precept upon which such a society rests: the maxim of social equality").
68. See STOCK, supra note 63, at 176.
69. See Maxwell J. Mehlman, How Will We Regulate Genetic Enhancement?, 34
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 671,687 (1999).
70. FUKUYAMA, supra note 54, at 218.
71. STOCK, supra note 63, at 162.
72. Michael J. Sandel, The Case Against Perlection, 293 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 51,
52 (Apr., 2004).
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that both groups are extended the equal protection of the laws, in any
genuinely meaningful sense, might well become increasingly
implausible.
The well-known philosopher Bernard Gert argues that "[g]erm line
gene therapy probably comes as close as is humanly possible to
guaranteeing that those families who can afford it will be able to
perpetuate their social and political dominance. '73 How the genetically
unenhanced would react to political domination is unclear. Some
writers cite the possibility of resistance in one form or another;74 others
raise the possibility of acquiescing in the system in exchange for a
portion of the economic benefits made possible by advanced
enhancements. 75 Competition and economic mobility would on such a
view become largely an intra-class phenomenon, rather than between
members of different classes.76
Even if the unenhanced groups react passively to political
domination, whether coerced, bribed, socialized, or freely persuaded in
doing so, the underlying equal protection issues would remain. Nor do
the obvious equal protection concerns dissolve even if we choose to say
that the unenhanced are not being exploited77 or discriminated against.79
The gulf separating these classes79 could be more profound than even
some historic caste divisions, and could raise issues of equality and
equal protection at the level of basic human rights.8°
73. Bernard Gert, Genetic Engineering: Is It Morally Acceptable?, U.S.A. TODAY
MAGAZINE, Jan. 1999, at 30 (issuming that "gene therapy will be, for the foreseeable
future, a very expensive procedure, so only the wealthy will be able to afford it").
74. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
75. See, e.g., Mehlman, supra note 49, at 552-53.
76. See id. at 553.
77, See, e.g., the discussion in Bostrom, supra note 60, at 502.
78. See id.; STOCK, supra note 63, at 140.
79. Of course, the reference to classes is something of an idealization; for some
purposes, references to persons would be more accurate. Society will not be divided
into the entirely unenhanced and an elite benefiting equally within itself from equally
advanced enhancements. Doubtless there will be a continuum ranging from overall least
enhanced to overall most enhanced. Some persons may be able to afford few or no
crucial enhancements. Other persons will have some but not all crucial enhancements,
and perhaps a few persons will be able to afford and will be willing to pay for all of the
crucial enhancements at critical times. The mixes of enhancements purchased may also
vary, perhaps widely. It is possible that one person's unenhanced skills might in some
historical period exceed another's enhanced skills. Crucially, though, the fact that
everyone fits somewhere along a complex continuum does not mean that everyone is
receiving equal protection of the laws.
80. See, e.g., George J. Annas et al., Protecting the Endangered Human: Toward
An International Treaty Prohibiting Cloning and Inheritable Alterations, 28 AM. J.L. &
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III. ENHANCEMENTS AND THE CHANGING PROBLEMS OF INEQUALITY
The precise effects of human enhancements on inequalities among
persons are unpredictable. Such effects will depend upon many things.
Among these, surely, will be the technical nature and means of
implementing the enhancements in question, their costs, overall social
wealth, pre-existing economic inequalities, private and public health
provision and health insurance, educational policies, cultural attitudes
toward the redistribution of wealth, opportunities, and responsibility, as
well as our sense of competing moral obligations toward persons in
other cultures, our fellow citizens, and our own descendants.
Some of these factors may interact in important ways. For
example, the early adopters of any enhancement technology might gain
decisive advantages, opening up inequalities that broaden, deepen, and
compound in practice. This could be loosely akin to the advantages
held by a natural monopoly.81 But the costs of different enhancements
may unpredictably drop at different rates, affecting their value to early
adopters. And what if later versions of an enhancement are not only
much lower in cost, but more powerful, more sophisticated, less"clunky," and have a more immediate impact? What if adopting an
early version of the enhancement actually impairs one's ability to
benefit from the later, more sophisticated versions?
We shall see at the end of this section how some innovations may
result not only in greater inequality, but in self-perpetuating, self-
reinforcing, cumulating inequalities, with some crucial advantages
translating themselves into other sorts of advantages, perhaps at
unprecedented rates and scopes. Separate forms of enhancement, when
joined together, may crucially augment one another and display a
synergistic effect. Eventually, some enhancements, perhaps bearing
upon information processing ability, may themselves become
automatically self-enhancing enhancements that further worsen
problems of inequality.
MED. 151, 154 (2002) (specifying the concern "that by altering fundamental human
characteristics to the extent of possibly producing a new human species or subspecies
genetic science will cause the resulting persons to be treated unequally or deprived of
their human rights"). Consider, in the extreme, the complications raised by, e.g.,
Kopinski, supra note 48. See also Weiss, supra note 48.
81. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 361 (6th ed.
2003); STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 261
(5' h ed. 2002) (noting the possibility that one firm may, by virtue of its advantaged
position, continue to expand its productive capacity at a lower cost than would be faced
by any competitor newly entering the same market).
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We can hope that the factors at work in every given case somehow
make the enhancement adoption process friendly toward equality. But
there are no guarantees of equality-friendly results in all cases. For
example, inequalities may exist even where unenhanced persons are in
some sense sufficiently 82 well off, the quality of their lives is
acceptable, 83 they can still exercise meaningful conscious agency, 84 they
are subjectively happy 85 and good at turning their circumstances into
happiness,8 6 or they are even unaware ofO7 or indifferent toward88 their
unequal status.
After all, equality is clearly a comparative concept.89 Admittedly,
there seems to be language in some Supreme Court opinions, such as the
majority opinion in the educational funding case San Antonio Indep.
School Dist. v. Rodriguez,90 that may suggest otherwise. 9' But one
82. See, e.g., Richard J. Arneson, Why Justice Requires Transfers to Offset Income
and Wealth Inequalities, 19 SOCIAL PHIL. & PoL'Y 172, 174 (2002) (discussing
sufficiency-oriented approaches to distributive justice).
83. See id.
84. See id. at 191 n.20 (2002) (discussing ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY,
RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LAW, ch. 9 (1999)).
85. See G.A. Cohen, On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, 99 ETHICS 906, 918
(1989) (discussing the case of Dickens's Tiny Tim). See also Amartya Sen, Equality of
What?, in EQUAL FREEDOM 307, 313 (Stephen Darwall ed., 1995).
86. See Cohen, supra note 85, at 918.
87. But cf. Derek Parfit, Equality and Priority, 10 RATIO 202, 219 n.31 (1997) ("It
is not bad for me if, unknown to me and without affecting me, there exist some other
people who are better off than me") (contrasting this approach with the argument in
JOHN BROOME, WEIGHING GOODS ch. 9 (1991)).
88. Inequalities can still exist not only where they are unrecognized by one or both
of the relevant persons or groups, but where they are not objected to by the subordinate
group. Consider a group of unenhanced persons who would not wish to change places
with or even redistribute from a wealthier and more influential group of enhanced
persons regarded by the former as excessively, unattractively intelligent, or as
freakishly, inhumanly strong.
89. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS V(3)(A) (Christopher Rowe trans.
2002); Ronald Dworkin, Equality, Luck and Hierarchy, 31 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 190, 198
(2003) (distinguishing provision for everyone's basic needs from a further concern for
equality, particularly in the form of equality of status). Nor can the comparisons be
confined to, say, comparing a person's share merely with the size of a sufficient share,
or even comparing two persons' shares merely with regard to whether they are both
minimally sufficient.
90. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
91. See id. at 24. The Court observed that "the Equal Protection Clause does not
require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages" at least in the context of wealth.
An analogous logic would, however, presumably not hold in apportionment cases. Cf.
Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983), or in a voting rights case in which voters of
one race cast ballots even 99% of the weight of those of another race. In Rodriguez, the
majority pointedly noted that the equal protection plaintiffs had not claimed "an absolute
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cannot make equality into a non-comparative or only limitedly
comparative matter of being sufficiently well off, or having some
minimal amount of a good in question.92 This is true of distributions of
rights and social benefits as well as of capacities and actions. Two
persons may equally enjoy having a pension, a capacity to feel pleasure,
or self-consciousness, but their pensions may be unequal, just as their
capacities to feel pain or for self-consciousness may be unequal.
Whether it is more important that two persons equally have merely
some degree of capacity, or that their degrees of capacity are unequal,
depends upon context. A crucial reason for not killing a person may be
the victim's mere capacity for self-consciousness, the bare minimal
capacity being shared equally with other persons.93 But we may, on the
other hand, economically reward persons unequally for their unequal
capacities. Little may depend on the fact that a less productive job
applicant has some minimal productivity to offer. In economic markets,
it is the inequalities of capacity that may be crucial.
We thus have no persuasive reason to believe that the rise of
enhancements will likely dissolve problems of inequality. And there is
some reason to believe that the rise of enhancements may eventually
make the norm of personal equality both more difficult to understand in
theory, and more difficult to achieve in practice. Of course, the actual
effects of future enhancements will likely depend upon the sorts of
cultural and economic factors mentioned at the beginning of this
section. But the looming possibilities of increased problems in theory
and in practice seem clear enough.
To understand the broadest and most distinctive theoretical
problem, we must first face the blurring of many familiar and
comfortable distinctions in the specific context of inequality and future
enhancements. A number of familiar distinguishing concepts and
categories will almost certainly come to be of diminishing value, if not
entirely useless.
deprivation of the desired benefit." Id. at 23. It remains true, however, that two slices
of the pie are not equal merely because the smaller slice still amounts to some of the pie,
and not an absolute deprivation of all pie. For further discussion of both Rodriguez and
Karcher, see infra section V.
92. More abstractly, group A may enjoy less official concern and respect than
group B, and in that sense be denied equal treatment, even where some level of concern
and respect is accorded to group A.
93. For a recent search for viable grounds in equal capacity for the widely
endorsed idea of the equality of persons, see JOHN E. COONS & PATRICK M. BRENNAN,
BY NATURE EQUAL (1999).
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Future enhancements may, as we have seen, lead to more
compounding and mutual reinforcement of the familiar forms of
inequality. Increasingly, inequalities of one sort may be strongly linked
with inequalities of other sorts, rather than cutting across or somehow
mitigating other sorts of inequalities. Without engaging in unnecessarily
specific speculation, let us think about some of the possibilities.
Consider, for example, the familiar distinction between inequalities
that result from risky but free choices, and inequalities not resulting
from such choices. 94 There are inequalities for which we are said to be
responsible through our choices, and others for which we are not thus
responsible.9 5 As a matter of shorthand, we may say that some
inequalities arise through our own fault, and that others do not.96
While luck may play a role in many outcomes, there is said to be a
crucial if already somewhat blurry97 difference between option luck,
legitimized by our voluntary choices, and brute luck, which is not.98
Ronald Dworkin has famously emphasized this distinction,99 as well as
94. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE
OF EQUALITY 7 (2000); Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue Revisited, 113 ETHICS 106,
107 (2002) ("[e]quality of resources places special emphasis on people's responsibility
for the choices they make"); Samuel Scheffler, Equality As the Virtue of Sovereigns: A
Reply to Ronald Dworkin, 31 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 199, 199 (2003) ("luck egalitarianism"
as holding that "inequalities deriving from people's voluntary choices are acceptable,
whereas inequalities deriving from unchosen features of people's circumstances are
unjust"); Anne Phillips, Defending Equality of Outcome, 12 J. POL. PHIL. 1, 2 (2004)
(referring to distinguishing "between the illegitimate inequalities that arise from
circumstances beyond our control and those legitimate ones that arise from the exercise
of personal choice").
95. See, e.g., THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY 71 (1991) ("many of the
important things in life.. . cannot be regarded as goods or evils for which they are
responsible, and so fall under the egalitarian principle").
96. See, e.g., LARRY S. TEMKIN, INEQUALITY 17 (1993) ("what is objectionable is
some being worse off than others through no fault of their own") (emphasis in the
original); id. at 13 n.21 (defining 'fault' in this context to include non-moral
responsibility based on voluntary choices).
97. See DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY,
supra note 94, at 73 ("[o]bviously the difference between these two forms of luck can be
represented as a matter of degree, and we may be uncertain how to describe a particular
piece of back luck").
98. See id. ("[o]ption luck is a matter of how deliberate and calculated gambles
turn out-whether someone gains or loses through accepting an isolated risk he or she
should have anticipated and might have declined. Brute luck is a matter of how risks
fall that is not in that sense deliberate gambles").
99. See id. See also Peter Vallentyne, Brute Luck, Option Luck, and Equality of
Initial Opportunities, 112 ETHICS 529, 538 (2002) (distinguishing between brute luck
and option luck wherc relevant to both initial opportunities and to outcomes, but without
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the related distinction between resource distributions that are properly
"ambition-sensitive" l° ° and those that are unfairly "endowment-
sensitive."101
In developing their descriptive theory and policy
recommendations, leading egalitarians have relied upon these and
further classic distinctions. The great twentieth century British theorist,
R.H. Tawney, for example, sought to distinguish between equality of
"capacity"' 0 2 on the one hand, and equality of "circumstances" '10 3 on the
other. Tawney similarly attempted to distinguish between equality or
inequality of "personal gifts" n04 and of "the social and economic
environment."' 05
More recently, Elizabeth Anderson has distinguished "supposed
cosmic injustice"'1 6 from "distinctively political"'0 7 inequalities, with
the former typically including such things as "being born with poor
native endowments, bad parents, and disagreeable personalities,
suffering from accidents and illness, and so forth."'' 0  Ronald
Dworkin's theory has been said to depend upon a presumably similar
distinction between inequality of resources that are impersonal or
external to the person, and thus "a part of the world,"' 0 9 and inequality
of personal resources, including "a person's physical and mental
capacities."1 10
recognizing a possible future category of choice or option outcome luck with regard,
remarkably, to one's initial opportunities).
100. DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY,
supra note 94, at 89.
101. Id.
102. R.H. TAWNEY, EQUALITY 48 (1971) (1952).
103. See id. Cf. Dworkin. supra note 89, at 192 ("the distinction between people's
choices and their circumstances is of central importance to justice").
104. See TAWNEY, supra note 102, at 49.
105. See id.
106. Elizabeth S. Anderson, What Is the Point of Equality? 109 ETHICS 287, 288
(1999).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Michael Otsuka, Luck, Insurance, and Equality, 113 ETHICS 40, 42 (2002)
(discussing Ronald Dworkin's theory).
110. Id. See also Ronald Dworkin, Foundations of Liberal Equality, in EQUAL
FREEDOM 190, 293 (Stephen Darwall ed., 1995) ("liberal equality requires that
impersonal resources be adjusted to compensate for differences in personal resources").
Amartya Sen's related focus on a person's capability seeks to bridge internal and
external or social elements through the idea of freedom. See AMARTYA SEN,
INEQUALITY RFFXAMINED 49 (1992),
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Understandably, we have also come to think of one's sheer bodily
resources, whatever their value, as "nontransferable assets,"' 11 thus we
do not literally redistribute a person's keen or myopic vision to others.
In contrast, the resources we think of as impersonal, such as arable land,
a sophisticated computer system, cash, or stocks and bonds, are thought
of as "transferrable assets."1 12
All of these distinctions may have their uses in proper contexts.
But even with current technologies, we sense a blurring," 3 if not an
utter unraveling, of the various distinctions above. We can easily
appreciate that what we often think of as personal capacities, talents,"natural" gifts, or personal assets are actually in some measure social
constructs, and to a degree culturally arbitrary constructs at that. The
economic value of a special aptitude for slaying mastodons or
controlling the flight of a golf ball is hardly culturally invariant.
One theorist notes that "[i]nequalities of talent are not simple facts
of nature. Of course, some people are more talented than others-but
only after culture has set standards that cooperate with nature to create
such differences."'"1 4 'Personal' talents may reflect more or less prior
investment of 'impersonal' assets. And as the basic distinctions
underlying our understanding of equality and inequality begin to blur, so
do the distinctions among the forms of equality we might seek. How
clear, for example, in a future of enhanced capacities is a distinction
between equal opportunity to gain access to the means of economic
well-being, and equal opportunity in the sense of genuine initially equal
prospects for economic well-being?" 15
And as these distinctions blur, we naturally wonder whether what
we thought of as an uncontrollable matter of sheer luck should instead
be thought of as a controllable matter of the fair or unfair distribution of
assets. 1 16 With the future development of various enhancement
technologies, even the boundary between changing a person's
111. See, e.g., the summary discussion of, among others, Ronald Dworkin in Larry
Alexander & Maimon Schwarzschild, Liberalism, Neutrality, and Equality of Welfare
vs. Equality of Resources, 16 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 85, 103 (1987).
112. Id.
113. See supra note 97.
114. DOUGLAS RAE ET AL., INEQUALITIES 70 (1983) (emphasis in the original).
115. Seeid, at75.
116. See, e.g., PHILIPPE VAN PARUS, WHAT'S WRONG WITH A FREE LUNCH? 25-26
(2001) (raising the possibility of considering various sorts of presumably personally
undeserved parental "gifts" or inheritances as either fairly or unfairly distributed, and in
the latter case perhaps objectionable).
QLR
ENHANCED AND UNENHANCED PERSONS
capabilities and changing the very identity of the person may
increasingly blur.' 17
There is a further difference, as well, between blurring a boundary
line and shifting where a clear boundary line lies. Future enhancements
may well actually shift the boundary between, for example, inequalities
that are practically inevitable, and inequalities that are subject to some
degree of choice and control. Fewer inequalities may be simply
inevitable,' "8 and more may become substantially alterable. 19 Shifting
these boundaries may bring more aspects of inequality under our
collective public control. Overall increased blurriness of our standard
conceptual boundaries, as well as shifts in those boundaries, may thus
add complexities to our understanding of inequalities.
One of the blurring distinctions above deserves some further
attention, as it may pose the most difficult and important problems for
equal protection. Let us therefore briefly consider the distinction
between inequalities flowing from one's voluntary choices, and
inequalities not flowing from such choices.120 This traditionally crucial
distinction may be both important and difficult to manage in the context
of future enhancements.
The basic idea, as traditionally modified by bankruptcy law 12' and
other practices and institutions, is that competent persons are assumed to
have no valid complaint concerning inequalities that stemmed from their
own more or less free, informed, voluntary choices, including principled
as well as risk-taking decisions. Each of these qualifiers could be
debated in general, and in particular cases. But for our purposes, the
problems of both the metaphorical and the literal "inheritance" of
117. See Jonathan Glover, Eugenics and Human Rights, in THE GENETIC
REVOLUTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 101, 110 (Justine Burley ed., 1999). More generally
"[a]s our powers over nature increase, we are bound to become less interested in what
men are, and more interested in what we make them to be." JOHN WILSON, EQUALITY
49(1966).
118. It is always possible to provide some financial compensation, for example,
even to victims of fatal diseases for which we have no meaningful treatment or cure.
119. See Hillel Steiner, Silver Spoons and Golden Genes: Talent Differentials and
Distributive Justice, in THE GENETIC REVOLUTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 133, 146 (Justine
Burley ed. 1999) ("[w]hat the genetic revolution does is to give a massive shove to the
always moving frontier between nature and nurture: it puts events and objects which
we've long treated as natural firmly into the domain of choice").
120. For this distinction, see, e.g., Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue Revisited, supra note
94, at 107; Scheffler, supra note 94, at 199.
121. See the Chapter 7 provisions available under the United States Bankruptcy
Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 10 1-1330 (2000) (enacted by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549).
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advantages and disadvantages from a genetic ancestor who has made
some crucial choice are of special interest.
In most contexts, and apart from such matters as welfare and
reparations 12 or gift, estate, and inheritance tax, 123 there is no equal
protection or other legal rule that the consequences of a person's
decision that have increased inequality must stop with that person's own
generation, or with those family members who somehow gave their
consent to the risky choices made. If family assets are freely and
knowledgeably invested in unfortunate ventures, the law does not
generally seek to limit the resulting inequalities to the consenting parties
only.
Setting aside the monumental administrative costs and
complexities involved in any other general policy, many may assume
that the prospect of advantaging one's own genetic descendants is both
an important incentive for effort and innovation,l1 4 and is generally not
unfair to others. The idea of providing for one's own children's
education-for their own human capitalization -2 5-and not comparably
those of others, is entirely familiar. 126 We do not, as a matter of equal
protection law, seek to frustrate such genetically confined impulses.1 27
But what if an ancestor's voluntary decisions, on whatever
grounds, resulted in the ancestor's having no transmissible genetic
122. See The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996 (Welfare Reform Act), 42 U.S.C. § 604a (1996). More broadly, see David Lyons,
Reparations and Equal Opportunity, 24 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 177 (2004).
123. See generally Economic Growth and Tax Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L.
No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38 (2001) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.). For broader normative commentary, see, e.g., Edward J. McCaffrey, The
Uneasy Case for Wealth Transfer Taxation, 104 YALE L.J. 283 (1994); Anne L. Alstott,
The Uneasy Liberal Case Against Income and Wealth Transfer Taxation, 51 TAX L.
REV. 363 (1996).
124. Despite occasional sightings of "I'm Spending My Kids' Inheritance" bumper
stickers.
125. For background, see GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL: A THEORETICAL AND
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO EDUCATION (National Bureau of
Economic Research 1964).
126. On various kinds of college tuition savings and payment plans, see, e.g.,
Michael A. Olivas, State College Savings and Prepaid Tuition Plans: A Reappraisal and
Review, 32 J.L. & EDUC. 475 (2003).
127. Thus we do not as a matter of public policy seriously discourage massive
parental investment in the most directly competitive aspects of childhood education,
preparing for aptitude exams, and expensive private schools. For serious arguments that
these sorts of massive investments in one's own children, at the expense of other gravely
needy but rescuable persons, are often morally unjustifiable, see, e.g., Peter Singer,
Famine, Affluence, and Morality, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 229 (1972); PETER UNGER, LIVING
HIGH AND LETTING DIE: OUR ILLUSION OF INNOCENCE 134, 135, 150 (1996).
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enhancements, and thus in no such genetic enhancements being
inherited by the ancestor's descendants? Let us for the moment set
aside cases in which the ancestor wanted transmissible genetic
enhancements for the sake of his or her descendants but was, unlike
others, unable to afford such enhancements through no personal fault.
The harder cases, it seems, would include unenhanced and now
therefore severely disadvantaged persons whose ancestors rejected
advanced genetic enhancements for reasons of moral or religious
principle, concern for the costs of a "gamble," safety concerns of
various sorts, or concerns over sheer efficacy and transmissibility.
In all of these cases, would we conclude that one's own fault, or
one's own voluntary choice, includes the choices of one's ancestors, to
which the now severely and perhaps irreparably burdened descendant
never consented? It is difficult to rule out all such scenarios as simply
unrealistic. Any particular enhancement-and perhaps even genetic
enhancements as a class-may well have been even more unaffordable
a generation ago.' 8
Consider as well that it may be difficult for a late adopter of
enhancement technology to competitively catch up with persons who
have been variously enhancing themselves, in cumulative and even
accelerating fashion, for decades. Can we be sure that the latest and
most powerful enhancements will not depend on whether one has
already incorporated and mastered previous enhancements of one sort of
another?
If early adopters are indeed likely to be well-placed to compound
and broaden their advantages through newer enhancement technologies,
and some do so, what patterns of inequality might we expect, given the
existence of late-adopters and non-adopters? Should we expect all these
groups to regard one another as genuinely equal fellow citizens? Will
there be more or less benign Amish, if not Benedictine-type, socio-
cultural separations? Will some or all of the unenhanced eventually be
widely regarded as in every crucial respect the cognitive and physical
inferiors of the enhanced? Should we then expect a stable, peaceful
society based on a closed, utterly hierarchical, caste-like domination?
What would genuine equal protection of the laws require in such a
context?
128. Consider the very loosely analogous case of decreases in the cost per unit of
computing power, expressed as Moore's Law. See, e.g., Michael R. Pakko, Comparing
Apples and Oranges, THE REGIONAL ECONOMIST, Oct., 2002, at
http://stiouisfed.org/publications/re/2002/d/pages/apples-oranges.html.
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If we are tempted to minimize the equal protection problems of
such a society, we should think further about the inequality-
compounding "cumulativity" problem. The cumulativity problem arises
when any form of inequality tends to translate itself into other
dimensions of inequality, thereby reinforcing and compounding overall
inequality. We begin to see fewer meaningful respects in which one
form of inequality cuts across or even inverts another meaningful form
of inequality, such that many sorts of persons see themselves as
privileged in some valued respect, though not in others." 9 Persons who
are thought of as "superior" in any key respect tend increasingly, given
cumulativity, to be thought of as "superior" in other key respects as
well.
This cumulativity problem is hardly a new one, as a glance at the
historical phenomenon of chattel slavery suggests. 130 Cumulativity of
inequalities may be an old and recurring problem,' but the severity and
scope of the cumulativity problem may vary over time and
circumstance. Consider the well-known dystopia, The Rise of the
Meritocracy, by the English social scientist Michael Young. 132 Young
referred to the old days in which, with mixed results "no class was
homogeneous in brains.' 33 Presumably, lack of brains in a member of
the economic elite often impairs the cementing of one's elite status.
Young goes on to fictionally report, however, that "[n]ow that people
are [accurately and unbiasedly] classified by ability, the gap between the
classes has inevitably become wider."'' 34
129. Classically, Plato's ideal Republic featured non-competing or cross-cutting
hierarchies of unequal possession of gold and other material goods, hierarchies of
persons with respect to bravery and prowess in defending the polis, and hierarchies in
ability to discern wisdom in public policy. While each of these hierarchies could
describe an important dimension of inequality, crucially, the privileged in one category
were not reinforcingly privileged in the other categories. See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC OF
PLATO (Francis M. Comford trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1945) (1941).
130. Presumably slavery is associated not only with unequal to non-existent income
and wealth on the part of the slave, along with unequal geographic and labor mobility,
marital eligibility, educational opportunities, etc. See, e.g., MARK V. TUSHNET, THE
AMERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY 1810-1860: CONSIDERATIONS OF HUMANITY AND INTEREST
(1981).
131. See, e.g., the discussion in MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE
OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 17 (1983) (expressing concern not just for the size of
inequalities, but for the problem of one or more forms of inequality being converted into
other forms of inequality through a multiplicative or reinforcement process).
132. See MICHAEL YOUING, THE RISE OF THE MERITOCRACY 1870-2033 (1958).
133. Id. at 106.
134. Id. Richard Sennett observes that "Michael Young... was a critic of his own
word; he feared a new division between elite and mass, an able elite which feels it
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Inequalities among persons in such a context can become clearer,
more severe, more rigid, and more pervasive across the various
dimensions of social life. Concisely put, "often the causal strings
run... from desirable genes to favorable socialization to success in a
competitive labor market to marriage with someone with desirable
genes."' 3 1 One form of inequality thus tends to reinforce itself by
translating itself into other forms of inequality.
By this point, we should sense some of the problems in assuming
the fairness of rewarding persons more for their greater economic
productivity, and less for their lesser economic productivity.
Productivity is not simply a matter of the exertion, once or over time, of
a freely exercised will. Productivity instead has crucial prerequisites
that are either equally or unequally distributed. One scholar has noted
"the close causal relationship between productive capacity and other,
unequal allocations-of capital, training, genetic advantage. If these are
unequally distributed, and lead to unequal productivity, why should this
determine yet another unequal pattern of allocation?" 136
If the development of more, and much more effective, techniques
of human enhancement increases the chances that persons unequal in
one crucial respect will be unequal in other crucial respects, the problem
of cumulating inequalities must worsen. This development, in turn,
would inevitably strain general social solidarity, any sense of
commonality, and the government's capacity to provide for the equal
protection of the laws in any meaningful sense. If the constitutional
guarantee of the equal protection of the laws is to be meaningful, there
must be limits to the reinforcing cumulativity of inequalities, 13 7 before
we develop caste-like hierarchies.
Overall, then, it seems unlikely that increasingly stark inequalities
between enhanced and unenhanced persons will simply reflect the
relevant person's free choices and deserved outcomes. The inequalities
generated by human enhancement technology will not simply be the
fault of all those who lag behind. The primary moral responsibility for
such inequalities and their legal consequences will instead lie with the
merits its privileges, a mass at once abashed and resentful of smart people." RICHARD
SENNETT, RESPECT IN A WORLD OF INEQUALITY 97 (2003).
135. DOUGLAS RAE ETAL., INEQUALITIES 6 (1983).
136. Id.
137. Cf DAVID MILLER, PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 242 (1999) (arguing against
"the emergence of large-scale, cumulative inequalities of advantage that make it difficult
for people to live together on terms of equality, even if politically they are all defined as
equals").
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electorate, the political branches, and ultimately a judiciary sworn to
give meaning to the equal protection of the laws.
IV. HUMAN ENHANCEMENTS AND THE MEANINGS OF EQUALITY AND
EQUAL PROTECTION
The idea of equality itself is certainly not self-clarifying. Even if
the idea of equality is not by itself empty, 138 the idea itself may not point
us to one particular public policy standard as opposed to another. 139
However we think of the idea of equality itself, we may still be able to
sort out more and less useful understandings of the more specific and
contextualized constitutional idea of the equal protection of the laws.
The looming prospect of advanced human enhancements may well
assist us in this effort.
The language of the equal protection of the laws is in itself
admittedly not much more determinate than the broader language of
equality itself.143 The equal protection clause has an obvious historical
context and a central historical focus, 14' but the terms and logic of equal
protection are both general and unclear. 142 The textual openness of the
equal protection clause has been recognized by commentators.143 While
the equal protection clause plainly arises from a particular context, 144
138. See the discussion on this issue between Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of
Equality, 95 I-IARV. L. REV: 537 (1982) and Kent Greenawalt, How Empty is the Idea of
Equality?, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1167 (1983) and then on somewhat different terms
between Christopher J. Peters, Equality Revisited, 110 HARV. L. REv. 1210 (1997)
(equality as arbitrary if not incoherent) and Kent Greenawalt, "Prescriptive Equality":
Two Steps Forward, 110 HARV. L. REv. 1265 (1997) (equality as a more substantively
useful concept at least in some narrow contexts).
139. See DOUGLAS RAE ET AL., INEQUALITIES 150 (1983) ("[w]e are always
confronted with more than one practical meaning for equality and equality itself cannot
provide a basis for choosing among them").
140. See Town of Ball v. Rapides Parish Police Jury, 746 F.2d 1049, 1056 (5th Cir.
1984).
141. See id. ("the Clause was enacted in 1868 as part of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which was directed at the destructive continuing racial discrimination after
the Civil War").
142. Id.
143. The court in Town of Ball itself, id. at 1056 n.19, cites Michael J. Perry,
Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REv.
1023, 1025 (1979) ("the language of the clause, after all, is opaque") and Owen Fiss,
Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 108 (1976) ("the text
[of the Clause] has no meaning").
144. Town of Ball, 746 F.2d at 1056.
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"the terms of equal protection were hardly limited and, at the same time,
are less than instructive....
History has supported the Supreme Court's modest conclusion that
"[t]he equal protection clause... is not susceptible of exact
delimitation."'' 46 What general sorts of admittedly inexact delimitations
are possible? If we borrow from Professor Kent Greenawalt's
discussion of equality in general, 47 as opposed to the distinct and
institutionally contextualized idea of equal protection, we are left with
five general possibilities:
First, the principle [of equality itself] may be tautological and empty. Second,
it may not be empty in this way, but it may prove on examination to be
mistaken or even incoherent. Third, the principle may carry direct
deontological force, indicatin moral considerations that do not depend on the
consequences of an action. Fourth, the principle may reflect generally
applicable consequentialist considerations.149 Fifth, the principle may express
deep-rooted feelings, not easily dispelled, to which decision makers
appropriately are responsive.150
Perhaps the equal protection of the laws, along with the more
general idea of equality itself, might be thought of in any of these terms.
Doubtless we would want first to explore deontological (direct right and
wrong) and consequentialist (good and bad outcome) understandings,
and even feeling-based understandings, of equal protection before
adopting the unnecessarily defeatist position that even the more
particular and contextualized idea of the equal protection of the laws is
empty or incoherent.
In its more general use in ethics and in political and legal
philosophy, the idea of equality can be fleshed out in various ways.
Writers have, for example, often focused on equality of welfare; 5'
145. Id.
146. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 37 (1928) (quoted in
Brower v. Bronkema, 377 Mich. 616, 646, 141 N.W.2d 98 (1966)).
147. See Kent Greenawalt, Prescriptive Equality: Two Steps Forward, 110 HARV.
L. REv. 1265, 1273 (1997).
148. For a slightly different take on equality as a deontological principle, see LARRY
S. TEMKIN, INEQUALITY 11 (1993) ("[o]n a deontological version inequality is primarily
relevant to assessing agents or actions").
149. For Professor Temkin's contrasting take on equality as a consequentialist or
teleological principle, see id. ("on a teleological version inequality is primarily relevant
to assessing outcomes").
150. Greenawalt, supra note 147, at 1273.
151. See, e.g., G.A. COHEN, IF YOU'RE AN EGALITARIAN, How COME YOU'RE SO
RiCH? 177 (2000).
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equality of resources; 152 equality of wealth; 153 equality of incomes; 154
equality of capacities;15 equality of respect or esteem; 156 equality of
concern; 157  equality of stake, voice, and status; 158 equality of
opportunity;' 59 and, on one open-ended listing, equality of "[1]iberties,
rights, utilities, incomes, resources, primary goods, need-fulfillments,
etc.,"' 160 as well as combinations of the above.'
61
The more particularized idea of equal protection of the laws may
certainly draw upon any of the above dimensions of equality. But for
our purposes, the literally relevant form of equality, upon which we
must focus, is the institution of the equal protection of the laws. This is
not to suggest that we must necessarily be able to decompose the
meaning of the equal protection of the laws into separate components.
The meaning of 'equal,' as a modifier, and the meaning of 'protection of
the laws,' may not necessarily yield in combination the meaning of
'equal protection of the laws.' The 'equal protection of the laws' as a
social practice or ideal may thus not be equal to the sum of its parts.
Perhaps there is something we can recognize as 'the protection of the
laws' by itself, which we should then somehow equalize. But certainly
we need not assume this in advance.
Whether we treat the equal protection of the laws as a compound or
as a unitary concept, we can begin to flesh out this concept through the
152. See, e.g., id.; RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE 12 (2000).
153. See, e.g., Alan Ryan, Does Inequality Matter-For Its Own Sake? 19 SOCIAL
PHIL. & POL'Y 225, 241 (2002).
154. See, e.g., id.
155. See, e.g., DAVID MILLER, PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 231 (1999).
156. See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 153, at 241; Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue
Revisited, 113 ETHICS 106, 106 (2002); R.H. TAWNEY, EQUALITY 113 (1971) (1952)
(referring to a "common tradition of respect and consideration").
157. See, e g., Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue Revisited, supra note 156, at 106; Samuel
Scheffler, Equality As the Virtue of Sovereigns: A Reply to Ronald Dworkin, 31 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 199, 205 (2003); Richard W. Miller, Too Much Inequality, 19 SOCIAL PHIL. &
POL'Y 275, 299 (2002).
158. See Ronald Dworkin, Equality, Luck and Hierarchy, 31 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 190,
190 (2003).
159. See, e.g., Lyons, supra note 122, at 183; Andrew Mason, Equality of
Opportunity and Differences in Social Circumstances, 54 PHIL. Q. 368 (2004).
160. AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY RE-EXAMINED 25 (1992). Professor Sen also
distinguishes equality of "incomes, wealth, opportunities, achievements, freedoms, [and]
rights." Id. at 12.
161. See, e.g., MILLER, supra note 155, at 231 (referring to, among other forms of
equality, equality of "opportunity for welfare").
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idea of governing "impartially. ' 162 But the very idea of 'impartiality' in
government decision-making depends upon some underlying
substantive theory of fair treatment that gives meaning and substantive
cohtext to the ideas of partiality and impartiality. The idea of impartial
governing gains meaning only through our making underlying
substantive choices about fairness in governmental decision-making.
We can see this more clearly if we think of a denial of equal
protection taking the form of a government decision "on the basis of
irrelevant criteria., 163 The relevance or irrelevance of some criterion of
government decision-making cannot be determined by examining the
bare verbal formulation of the equal protection of the laws. Criteria
such as test scores, physical strength, or resistance to disease, are not in
themselves necessarily indicative of government bias, partiality, or the
lack thereof. Some underlying substantive theory is required before we
can decide which, if any, of the above criteria count as partiality in any
particular equal protection case.
Further, and even more importantly, we cannot always rest content
with a theory that pronounces some difference among persons to be
relevant, even where that difference is indeed clearly linked to a
government aim and clearly does make some important practical
difference in the real world. It is in contexts such as that of human
162. See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 265 (1983) ("[t]he concept of equal
justice under law requires the state to govern impartially"). This formulation seems to
equate the equal protection of the laws and equal legal justice. It seems possible to think
of "equal legal justice" as narrower than, broader than, or in some respects both
narrower and broader than the equal protection of the laws. If the ideas are to be
equated, it would seem to follow that equal protection of the laws cannot be taken in any
particularly narrow, technical, or limited sense, lest it fail to encompass the broad notion
of equal justice. See also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211, 211 (1976) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (the equal protection clause as requiring "every State to govern
impartially"). Cf Town of Ball, 746 F.2d at 1056 (the equal protection clause's
"guarantee is both simple and wide--equal and uniform governmental classifications").
163. Christopher J. Peters, Equality Revisited, 110 HARV. L. REv. 1210, 1220
(1997). Deciding a case on the basis of irrelevant criteria may violate notions of
procedural due process, but such a decision may also, as in a typical case of racial
discrimination, deny the equal protection of the laws as well. See id.; Turner v. Fouche,
396 U.S. 346, 362 (1970) (formulating the traditional, minimalist equal protection test as"whether the challenged classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the
achievement of a valid state objective") (citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,
425 (1961)). A somewhat stronger, but no more independent, formulation has it that
governments must not "discriminate against their inhabitants except upon some
reasonable differentiation fairly related to the object of the regulation." Gerald Gunther,
Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer
Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 23 (1972).
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genetic and other enhancements that this becomes especially clear. We
must, it turns out, still ask about the history, consequences, and fairness
of even such evidently relevant differences among persons.
It is easy to assume that equal protection requires government
attention to relevant and not irrelevant differences among persons, with
treatment of persons to be somehow proportioned to the extent of the
relevant difference. Similarly situated people should be treated
similarly, but relevantly dissimilar people may, it is commonly
assumed, be treated in some proportionately dissimilar way.t 64  If
persons or groups differ in some way directly bearing upon a legitimate
aim sought by the government, those persons or groups may, it is
commonly thought, properly be treated in some correspondingly
unequal fashion.
We cannot pause here to develop the point, 165 but it is in contexts
such as human genetic and other enhancements that the inadequacy of
these common sense understandings of equal protection becomes most
noticeable. Dramatic differences in basic talents and capacities may
arise from differences in access to genetic and other sorts of
enhancements. And these dramatic disparities in basic talents and
capacities may indeed be crucially relevant to various legitimate and
important governmental purposes. But these circumstances alone do not
necessarily license the corresponding inequalities in the government's
treatment of the unequally capable persons. Much more must be
considered before we can assess the government's compliance with the
real requirements of equal protection.' 66
But how should we think of the real meaning of equal protection of
the laws? We find that the resources of several sorts of general theories
164. See, e.g., Reedv. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971); Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141,
147 (1940); F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920); United
States v. Horton, 601 F.2d 319, 324 (7th Cir. 1979) ("[elqual protection is the guarantee
that similar people will be dealt with in a similar manner and that people of different
circumstances will not be treated as if they were the same") (quoting JOHN NOWAK ET
AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 520 (1978)); Jenkins v. State, 540 P.2d 1363 (1976) (en
bane) (equal protection "does not require that things different in fact be treated in law as
though they were the same," but "it does require, in its concern for equality, that those
who are similarly situated be similarly treated") (quoting Joseph Tussman & Jacobus ten
Broek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REv. 341, 344 (1949)); Darren
Leonard Hutchinson, "Unexplainable On Grounds Other Than Race ": The Inversion of
Privilege and Subordination in Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 2003 U. ILL. L. REv.
615, 620 (equal protection clause as distinguishing between similarly situated and
dissimilarly situated groups or persons with respect to the purpose of the state action).
165. See generally infra sections IV-V.
166. See generally id.
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are available. Equal protection is often thought of in terms, first, of
anti-discrimination,167 however the latter idea may be fleshed out. Then,
there are also anti-differentiation approaches 168 to equal protection that
can in turn be contrasted with anti-subordination and group-focused
political process views. 169 A broad version of the latter sort has been
167. See, e.g., Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Anti-Discrimination
Principle, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1, 1 (1976) (hereinafter Paul Brest, Foreword) ("[b]y the'anti-discrimination principle' I mean the general principle disfavoring classifications
and other decisions and practices that depend on the race (or ethnic origin) of the parties
affected); Joseph Tussman & Jacobus ten Broek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37
CAL. L. REv. 341, 342 (1949) (referring to, among other functions of the equal
protection clause, its use "to oppose 'discriminatory' legislation," with no apparent
contextual restriction to matters of race or ethnicity); Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the
Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 108 (1976) ("the anti-discrimination
principle embodies a very limited conception of equality, one that is highly
individualistic and confined to assessing the rationality of means"). While some
versions of the anti-discrimination principle may indeed be this deficiently narrow, Paul
Brest's version seeks to prevent not only irrationalities of means, but unfairness more
generally, at least in the realm of process, as well as "certain harmful results of race-
dependent decisions." Paul Brest, Foreword, at 6.
168. See, e.g., Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal
Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003 (1986) (anti-differentiation on any given
classification as rejecting different treatment on that basis); Hutchinson, supra note 164,
at 620 ("[alt its most rudimentary level, the Equal Protection Clause prohibits states
from differentiating among similarly situated groups or individuals"); Jeffrey A. Roy,
Carolene Products: A Game-Theoretic Approach, 2002 B.Y.U. L. REv. 53, 78 (equal
protection anti-differentiation theories as focusing on the rights of individuals as
opposed to group statuses or the process of group subordination).
169. See, e.g., Colker, supra note 168 (arguing generally against racial and sexual
subordination in various contexts); Roy, supra note 168, at 78 (anti-subordination
theories as focusing on group statuses and on the process of group subordination);
Daniel Markovits, How Much Redistribution Should There Be?, 112 YALE LJ. 2291,
2292-93 (2003) (emphasizing non-subordination in ways that reflect what is deemed
fundamental or important about persons). One might attempt to distinguish anti-
differentiation theories from anti-subordination theories by supposing that the latter
would be more naturally accommodating of affirmative action programs. But it is also
possible to imagine some version of anti-differentiation theory at least as open to
affirmative action as some version of anti-subordination theory. For various ordinary
understandings of 'subordination,' see OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE (2d ed.
1989), at http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/00240 9 14 (visited Feb. 24, 2004). Anti-
subordination theories of equal protection are often linked to theories that emphasize
relevant political processes, or defects therein. See, e.g., Colker, supra note 168; Roy,
supra note 168, at 78; Michael J. Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal
Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 308-09 (1991) (political process theories as
identifying "suspect classifications according to criteria of historical discrimination and
political impotence"); Stephen M. Rich, Ruling By Numbers: Political Restructuring
and the Reconsideration of Democratic Commitments After Romer v. Evans, 109 YALE
L.J. 587, 591 (1999) (process-based equal protection theories as concerned to prevent
the political process from generating "perpetual losers"); C. Edwin Baker, Outcome
Equality or Equality of Respect: The Substantive Content of Equal Protection, 131 U.
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referred to as anti-group-disadvantaging theory,170 while a narrower but
important version of anti-subordination theory is the widely discussed
anti-caste principle.'17  As it turns out, even the most extreme
formulations of the anti-caste principle will be useful for our purposes.
Even some approaches that arguably stop short of seeking equality, such
as those that focus on social inclusion1 72 or on building a cohesively
unified peaceful community 173 will be relevant to our equal protection
inquiry. And finally, at the deepest level, we must consider accounts of
equal protection that focus on affirming that particular persons or
groups are fully and truly human.1 74 The latter such accounts of equal
protection we may think of as human rights-based theories175
Any of the above approaches may have something to contribute to
a full understanding of equal protection in the context of genetic and
other human enhancements. Anti-discrimination theory might at a
PA. L. REv. 933, 933 (1983) (reacting to "the failure of all attempts to develop a
coherent approach to the clause based entirely on process, rationality, or representation-
reinforcing considerations"). The latter reference is centrally to the classic work of
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 87-88 (1980).
170. See Fiss, supra note 167, at 108.
171. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Anti-Caste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REv. 2410,
2411 (1994) (anti-caste principle as prohibiting "translating highly visible and morally
irrelevant differences into systemic social disadvantage unless there is a very good
reason for society to do so"); David Estlund, Review of Cass Sunstein, Designing
Democracy, 113 ETHICS 911, 913 (2003) (a society divided into "readily identifiable"
higher and lower caste members would deny to the latter "the equal role in political
deliberations to which they are entitled"); Kenneth L. Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17
GA. L. REv. 245, 247-48 (1983) (treatment of a person as "part of a dependent caste" as
presumptively degrading, stigmatizing, disrespecting, and thus contrary to the "equal
citizenship principle that is at the core of the Fourteenth Amendment").
172. See, e.g., Hugh Collins, Discrimination, Equality and Social Inclusion, 66
MODERN L. REv. 16, 22 (2003) ("[t]he group of social excluded is defined rather as
people who are effectively prevented from participating in the benefits of citizenship or
membership in society owing to a combination of barriers").
173. See Fiss, supra note 167, at 151 (elimination of caste might promote
community cohesion, peace, and development of the capacities of the currently
subordinated). See also the discussion of "minimal conditions of cooperation" and of
"the minimum required for the preservation of society" in Shelly Kagan, Does
Consequentialism Demand Too Much? Recent Work On the Limits of Obligation, 13
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 239, 242 (1984).
174. In the context of his discussion of "the fundamental anti-discrimination norm,"
Professor Michael J. Perry bars a range of unequal governmental treatment based on,
among other proscribed motives, "a view to the effect that the disfavored citizens are not
truly or fully human-that they are, at best, defective, even debased or degraded, human
beings." MICHAEL J. PERRY, WE THE PEOPLE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE
SUPREME COURT 76 (1999). See also id. at 81.
175. See id. at 76; Michael J. Perry, Human Rights As Morality, Human Rights As
Law (unpublished manuscript).
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minimum ask that we not irrationally underrate the capacities of the
unenhanced or irrationally overrate those of the artificially enhanced.
Depending on how anti-discrimination theory is developed, such a
theory might only legitimize, while not exaggerating, a vast gulf
between the enhanced and the unenhanced. But anti-discrimination
theory, taken in another direction, might also usefully direct suspicion at
any system of legally enforced reward and privilege, even those
formulated in terms of genuine differences in clearly relevant capacities,
that distinguish too casually or too non-historically between the
enhanced and the unenhanced.
Similarly, anti-differentiation theories may be of more or less use
to the unenhanced depending on how such theories are developed. If, in
the extreme, the idea is that the enhanced and unenhanced should not be
treated differently in ways traceable to their enhanced or unenhanced
status, the constitutional benefits to unenhanced persons could be
dramatic. If, on the other hand, anti-differentiation theory ignores the
history and current status and prospects of the unenhanced as a group, or
if the enhanced and unenhanced are seen merely as relevantly
differently situated, hence properly differentiated, the unenhanced stand
to gain little from anti-differentiation theory.
Anti-subordination and group-focused political process approaches
may seem more generally favorable to the unenhanced than are anti-
differentiation approaches, but this would again depend upon how both
sorts of theories are developed. t7 6  There could be strongly re-
distributive anti-differentiation theories, and extremely narrow anti-
subordination theories. An emphasis on political process may or may
not be of much help to the unenhanced. In time, the genetically and
otherwise enhanced may come to be immediately distinguishable,
perhaps visually, from the unenhanced. In every practical respect, the
unenhanced may come to meet the classic literal requirements of a
"discrete and insular"'177 politically powerless minority.
Whether the Court would be receptive to an anti-subordination or
political process theory on behalf of the genetically unenhanced is far
from clear. In some cases, unenhanced status may be meaningfully
176. See supra note 169.
177. See United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); Roy,
supra note 168; Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REv. 713
(1985); Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1087
(1982).
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alterable. 178 To some degree one's enhanced versus unenhanced status
may reflect one's pre-existing wealth or poverty. But the equal
protection rights of identifiably poor, 79 homeless, 80 or uneducated,81
persons to redress on that basis may be limited. And even if the
unenhanced quite predictably continue to lag economically 182 or hold
only limited and diminishing political influence, 183 their available
redress under the equal protection clause might still be limited.18
4
To the extent that there are clearly identifiable, even immediately
visible, distinctions between persons with and without various important
enhancements, questions of caste arise. Some useful enhancements may
eventually become both widely affordable and unobjectionable to most
persons. But if divisions between those largely with and without crucial
enhancements harden and multiply, questions of caste 85 may be
inescapable. Whether the grounds of caste are technically genetically
inheritable, as some enhancements may be, is less important than
whether the relevant differences and their practical life effects can
realistically be overcome.186
178. The Court noted the alterability of one's classification as an adult alien in
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982).
179. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (applying minimum scrutiny
re state imposed maxima on family welfare benefits).
180. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (no elevated equal protection
scrutiny regarding housing needs).
181. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (no
fundamental federal constitutional right to an education for equal protection purposes).
182. See Dandridge, 397 U.S. 471; RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE
MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 36 (1996) (rejecting "a degree of
economic equality" as a constitutional right); LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF,
ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 16 (1991) ("[i]f we were writing a Constitution ... we
might well favor ... a constitutional provision setting a ceiling on the intergenerational
transmission of wealth .... But ... it is quite impossible to read our Constitution as
including [such a provision]") (emphasis in the original).
183. For discussion of some practical limits on minority electoral influence in the
racial context, see, e.g., Lani Guinier, Groups, Representation, and Race-Conscious
Redistricting: A Case of the Emperor's Clothes, 71 TEX. L. REv. 1589 (1993); Lani
Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black
Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077 (1991).
184. But cf Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 932 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(distinguishing between perpetuating "a caste system" and "eradicating racial
subordination" in the context of voting redistricting).
185. See supra notes 171, 173.
186. Thus, whether a parent's advantage can be genetically transmitted may not be
crucial if the advantage, or the benefits accruing from the advantage, can be conferred
through non-genetic cultural means. The practical insurmountability of an advantage
may be more important than whether it is literally inheritable.
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We have seen that some enhancements will be more practically
crucial in affecting basic life opportunities than others. Some may be
especially costly, and may remain so over time. Others may be morally
objectionable to some non-dominant groups. Some enhancements may
interact synergistically with others. The advantages of some
enhancements may compound over time. Some enhancements may
even make meaningful interaction with unenhanced persons less
attractive, or even less possible. Some may hold less value for late
adopters. Some may build upon or otherwise presume earlier
enhancements. Some enhancements may themselves be automatically
self-enhancing. A few enhancements may be all of the above.
Enhancements that display any of the above qualities are especially
likely to raise issues of caste. At some point, persons with the above
sorts of enhancements may find that they have little in common with the
generally unenhanced, or with the merely low-tech enhanced. While all
sorts of persons, including the unenhanced, may have some minimally
useful social role to play, any pretense of social and economic equality,
or equality of political standing, let alone equality of political influence,
may become difficult to sustain. That there really are significant and
relevant differences in basic abilities between castes is largely beside
the point.
At that point a serious and responsive anti-caste approach to the
equal protection clause would call for some form of meaningful,
substantive redress. If we face a high-tech, largely market-driven caste
system, unprecedented in its disparities, then merely formalistic' 87
approaches to equal protection will not suffice. At such a point, we
must appreciate that a functioning democracy has some inescapable
substantive prerequisites. The Supreme Court has already recognized in
at least one context that "[t]he Equal Protection Clause was intended to
work nothing less than the abolition of all caste-based and invidious
class-based legislation."' 88 To this must be added legislation and other
forms of state action that support and preserve a caste system.
If the courts insist, however, on distinguishing for equal protection
purposes among different kinds of caste systems, we must then
emphasize the unique potential for rigidity and near impermeability of
caste systems reflecting unequal human enhancements. Traditional low
187. Formalism and a sense of the perils and complications ofjudicial intervention
pervade San Antonio Indep. School Dist, v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) and the
discussion infra section V.
188. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 213 (1982).
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tech caste systems, after all, have been limited by genetic
commonalities, where even great disparities in wealth could do
relatively little to disguise those commonalities. Dramatically advanced
future human enhancements, unequally distributed, may lead to far
greater capacity differences among persons.
Suppose it becomes possible for some persons, through their
special access to technology, to obtain and meaningfully apply
information hundreds of times faster than their unenhanced colleagues.
Suppose these and other inequalities were self-compounding. Would it
be surprising if meaningful decision-making power tended to
increasingly concentrate within the group of the enhanced? Would it be
surprising to see "equality" in such a society increasingly understood as
merely proportionately unequal treatment for plainly unequal persons?
Would it be surprising for an increasingly stark, deep, and broad social
separation to develop between the elite and the unenhanced? Or even
for the view to eventually arise that "the disfavored citizens are, at best,
defective, even debased and degraded, human beings."'1 89
Ultimately, though, concern for the meaningful equal protection
rights of the unenhanced in a divided society need not confine itself
within the bounds of any single one of the several insightful approaches
to equal protection theory discussed briefly above. As we shall now
see, by considering examples from the Court's equal protection
jurisprudence, the decisive choice is not so much of explicit, formal
theory, but between giving genuine substance to the equal protection
clause and reducing the equal protection clause to formalistic triviality.
V. CHOOSING AMONG APPROACHES TO EQUAL PROTECTION:
HUMAN ENHANCEMENTS AND THE LOGIC OF EQUAL PROTECTION
Unequal access to crucial human enhancements can pose
remarkably severe and important problems of unequal protection of the
laws. We here realistically assume state action in the form of some tax
or subsidy policy, government supported technological research,
government hiring and contracting policies, government medical
programs, control over health insurance, or otherwise. 90
189. See PERRY, supra note 174, at 76.
190. As merely one possible form of the necessary state action, a government as
employer may fulfill the Fourteenth Amendment state action requirement by preferring
much more capable genetically or otherwise enhanced candidates for government
employment over far less capable unenhanced such candidates. Cf Wygant v. Jackson
Bd. of Educ., 478 U.S. 1014 (1986) (equal protection violation in racially-based public
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As a matter of basic equal protection law, there are three possible
routes to likely judicial redress of the alleged denial of equal protection.
The first requires that the plaintiff show a denial of equal protection of
the laws with respect to a recognized fundamental right or interest of
federal constitutional status. 91 The second route requires showing that
the government has denied equal protection on historically suspect lines,
such as race or ethnicity. 92 And occasionally, as a third route, an equal
protection challenge can succeed if the court concludes that only
constitutionally illegitimate purposes or justifications underlie the
unequal treatment at issue. 193 None of these three routes, however, in
their traditional forms seems ideally suited, without modification, to
capture the essence of human enhancement equal protection problems.
Doubtless one or more of the three standard approaches, including
especially the suspect classification approach, 194 and less clearly the
constitutionally fundamental interest approach,195 could be adapted to fit
the problems of unequal human enhancements. The basic equal
protection problems posed by unequal enhancements are, however, in a
sense so obvious, severe, and direct as to bypass any practical need for
school teacher layoff protection plan); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200
(1995) (imposing equal protection strict scrutiny in case of denial of government
contract to non-disadvantaged business enterprises).
191. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966)
(recognizing voting in state elections as a fundamental right for equal protection
purposes even though not expressly protected by the constitutional text).
192. See, e.g., Adarand, 515 U.S. 200 (race-based presumptions in government
programs as evoking strict scrutiny); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (but not
without a showing of racial intent or a program reference to race).
193. See, e.g-, Dep't ofAgric v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (unrelated individual
in household food stamp rules as without any legitimate justification); City of Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (special permit burdening of group home
for mentally retarded persons invalidated under minimum equal protection scrutiny).
194. See the cases cited supra note 192 (requiring the promotion of a compelling or
overridingly important public interest by the least constitutionally burdensome or most
narrowly tailored means available). See also Gruttcr v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)
(upholding public law school affirmative action in admissions program).
195. See supra note 191. For related discussion, see Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct.
2472, 2484 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (comparing equal
protection and substantive due process-based approaches) (citing, e.g., Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)). Of special interest for our purposes is Justice O'Connor's
quotation of Justice Lewis Powell: "A legislative classification that threatens the
creation of an underclass ... cannot be reconciled with the Equal Protection Clause"
(quoting Powell, J., concurring in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 239 (1982)). Lawrence,
123 S. Ct. at 2487 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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any general mediating principles such as the three standard models
noted above. 9 6
At least as important as the choice among the standard equal
protection models is a court's choice between formalism and a more
substantively responsive approach to the constitutional problems of
human enhancement. Formalistic approaches to equal protection can, in
their place, be intellectually defensible, and they can in their own way
be rigorous and extremely demanding. They can in a limited sense even
be pragmatic when counting the costs of equality. Formalistic equal
protection in our context, however, could easily lead to the disaster of
merely ratifying trends that undermine the very idea of an integrated
political society.
Among the well-known modem equal protection cases, the public
school funding case of San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez' 97 stands out for its equal protection formalism. Arguably,
Rodriguez's formalism descends into what we might call equal
protection reductionism. The Court's formalism in Rodriguez does not
mean that substance and practicality are in every respect ignored.
Rather, there is a heightened substantive concern only for the costs of
equality, as distinct from the logic and the favorable public
consequences of equality.
The plaintiffs in Rodriguez sought the application of strict judicial
scrutiny to a Texas public school funding system involving an overlay
of redistributive transfers upon a local property tax-based funding
system. The Supreme Court, dividing 5-4, rejected the application of
equal protection strict scrutiny on both of two asserted grounds.'98 First,
even if the plaintiff class could establish its disproportionate poverty,
the Constitution does not recognize wealth and poverty as a suspect
196. It is not uncommon for scientists and philosophers to speak merely of fairness
and justice in the allocation or distribution of the benefits of genetic science. The
question of the appropriate level of equal protection scrutiny of the relevant government
policy, on whatever theory, does not seem to naturally arise. Of course, some
specification of what fairness requires must inescapably arise. See, e.g., Colin Farrelly,
Genes and Justice: A Rawlsian Reply to Moore 16 BIOETHIcS 72, 73 (2002)
("governments must take the necessary steps to ensure that [genetic research] benefits
are fairly distributed. And these steps might require limiting property or privacy
rights"). Professor Ronald Dworkin seems to focus more centrally on the question of
"leveling down" versus "leveling up" in the genetic engineering context than on equal
protection scrutiny levels. See RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY
AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY 440 (2000) ("[t]he remedy for injustice is redistribution, not
denial of benefits to some with no corresponding gain to others").
197. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
198. See id. at 44.
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classification. 199 Nor was strict scrutiny equal protection available by
characterizing a right to a public school education as a fundamental
right for federal constitutional purposes1 ° The Court majority then
went on to find the Texas school funding system rationally related to a
legitimate public interest or purpose.20' Thus the funding system did not
violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.20 2
There is certainly much of importance in the majority's discussion
of these issues. But the Court's equal protection formalism-indeed,
what we can call its reductionist formalism-is most clearly illustrated
by the Court's discussion of what it took to be a prior, conceptual issue
in this context. Specifically, the Rodriguez Court stopped to consider
whether the denial of equal protection is best understood as the
absolute20 3 and complete denial of some benefit 20 4 made available to
others, or else as a relative 20 5 and comparative matter, where some
persons receive less of some benefit, and thus an unequal benefit, than
do others.
The Court, at least for this particular context, opted for the former
(absolute) as opposed to the latter (comparative) understanding of
inequality and equal protection. 0 6 The Court concluded that "at least
where wealth is involved, the Equal Protection Clause does not require
absolute equality or precisely equal advantages. ' '2° The Court's focus,
however, was not entirely on realistically excusing limited or small but
indeterminate differences in educational quality.20 8 The Court majority
apparently placed weight on the fact that even economically poor
students, or more accurately the students in the poorest districts, were
199. See id. at 33 ("in Dandridge v. Williams, . the Court's explicit recognition of
the fact that the administration of public welfare assistance ... involves the most basic
economic needs of impoverished human beings... [and] the central importance of
welfare benefits to the poor was not an adequate foundation for requiring the State to
justify its law by showing some compelling state interest").
200. Id. at 30 ("the importance of a service performed by the State does not
determine whether it must be regarded as fundamental for purposes of examination
under the Equal Protection Clause").
201. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 54-56.
202. See id. at 55.
203. See id. at 19.
204. As opposed to even the "absolute" denial of some possible portion of a benefit.
205. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 19.
206. See id. at 23-24.
207. id. at 24.
208. By contrast, compare the Court's rejection of such an approach in the context
of congressional reapportioning and the necessary equality in size of congressional
districts. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983), discussed infra section V.
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receiving some education, as opposed to being utterly and absolutely
deprived of an education. 20 9 And beyond this, the plaintiff students
were receiving an education deemed "adequate." 210
Whatever we may think of the Court's realism in assessing the
costs of the plaintiffs' desired remedies,2 11 we can see the Court's
approach as formalistic, and indeed reductionist, in assessing the logic
of the plaintiffs' claims. Equality, as normally understood, inescapably
includes a relative or comparative element underplayed by the
Rodriguez majority.
Suppose we are doling out slices of pie. Suppose further that we
wish to give everyone an equal size slice of this pie. Will this wish
generally be fulfilled by giving everyone a slice varying substantially by
recipient? Plainly it will not. People may differ in their need or appetite
for pie, or even their ability to convert pie into energy. Equality can, in
proper contexts, be mediated by differences in need or capacity to
benefit, as in health insurance contexts. But there are no such
corresponding concerns in the basic educational context of Rodriguez.
In the basic education context, persons have not necessarily received an
equal size slice even if each receives a substantial or for some purpose
adequate size slice.
The directly comparative dimension of equality does not disappear
if we substitute something complex, multi-dimensional, and intangible
such as basic education--or doubly intangible, if we substitute basic
educational opportunity-for easily distributable pie slices. Within
limits, there is some room for debate over relationships between
spending and real educational opportunities. In some contexts, it is
possible that seeking to approach actual equality in the distribution of
some good is unresponsive to features of persons or circumstances or is
too morally costly to undertake.21 2 But declining to pursue recognizably
greater equality in the distribution of anything-including equality in
educational opportunity-is not a defensible understanding of how to
realistically pursue the equal protection of the laws.
More briefly, Rodriguez also famously adopts a formalistic view of
equal protection-again, whether justifiably or not-in declining to
209. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 23.
210. Id, at 24.
211. See id.
212. See, e.g., Maxwell J. Mehlman, The Law ofAbove Averages: Leveling the New
Genetic Enhancement Playing Field, 85 IOWA L. REv. 517, 544 (2000) (noting the
argument from maintaining production incentives in favor of minimum, as distinguished
from equal, provision).
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recognize education" 3 as among the interests that are impliedly
fundamental for equal protection purposes. 21 4 For our own purposes, we
need not argue crudely that the interests of the future unenhanced are so
practically important that those interests should count as constitutionally
fundamental. Rather, one might well argue that the interests of future
unenhanced persons may well mark a dividing line between a
reasonably well integrated civic polity, in which citizens are
meaningfully peers, and the dramatic breakdown of the sort of society
contemplated by the equal protection clause and by the Constitution
itself.
By contrast with Rodriguez's reductionist formalism, consider
what we may call the rigorist formalism of the reapportionment case of
Karcher v. Daggett.215  In Karcher, New Jersey argued that its
congressional apportionment, newly revised in light of the most recent
census, satisfied Article I, section 2 of the Constitution. 216  The
maximum inequality among districts was said to be 0.7%,217 in light of
the inevitable census undercounts and other indeterminate departures
from the ideal.2 18
The Court resolved this case by interpreting the language of the
apportionment clause, which on its own terms admittedly makes no
reference to equality of any sort.219 But the apportionment clause has
been interpreted to require "equal representation for equal numbers of
213. The Court was not required by the facts to decide whether a complete denial to
the plaintiffs of all public schooling would implicate a constitutionally fundamental
interest. Whether the Court could, or would want to, avoid this stronger inference we
need not decide here.
214. See San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34
(1973) ("the key to discovering whether education is 'fundamental' is not to be found in
comparisons of the relative societal significance of education... Nor is it to be found by
weighing whether education is as important as the right to travel. Rather, the answer
lies in assessing whether there is a right to education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed
by the Constitution"). The right to vote in state elections was deemed preservative of
one's other constitutional rights and thus at least partly on this basis itself
constitutionally fundamental in Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966). And the existence of implied fundamental interests under the equal protection
clause bearing upon one's own future offspring was recognized in Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535 (1942), as cited by the Court in Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 34.
215. 462 U.S. 725 (1983).
216. See id. at 727.
217. Seeid. at 732.
218. See id. at 731-32.
219. See Karcher, 462 U.S. at 729 n.2 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2).
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people., 220 The equal protection standard of "one person, one vote" is
221of course quite similar.
On essentially equal protection standards, then, the Court in
Karcher interpreted Article I, section 2 to allow "only the limited
population variances which are unavoidable despite a good-faith effort
to achieve equality, or for which justification is shown., 22  The Court
thus did not simply insist on some ideal standard with some specified
departures from numerical equality being permitted. The Court's fear
was that "[i]f state legislators knew that a certain de minimus level of
population differences was acceptable, they would doubtless strive to
achieve that level rather than equality.22 3 The Court saw no principled
way, if it accepted a 0.7% maximum inequality as de minimus and
constitutionally trivial, to avoid similar claims for "0.8%, 0.95%, 1% or
1.1 %:,224
The formalism component in the Court's rigorously formalistic
approach can be expressed in terms of what the judicial battle in
Karcher seems genuinely to be about. There is of course not much real
difference between adopting one numerical standard for a de minimus
violation and adopting another very similar numerical standard. If the
Court were to accept a 0.7% standard, it would have no better reason for
rejecting a 0.8% standard than it would have for rejecting the voting
rights claims of persons who are statutorily a month or a year too young
to vote.
But would there be much genuine and substantive loss of equality
if the Court had accepted a maximum inequality standard at some point
lower than 0.7%? What would the real and substantive difference in
equality of protection be with, say, a fixed maximum 0.3% de minimus
standard? Again, the scope of what is considered a justified departure
from some ideal, if inevitably somewhat inaccurate, 225 baseline of
equality may expand or contract.2 6 Is any significant egalitarian value
really protected by the Court's approach in Karcher, and not by other,
low de minimus approaches?
220. Id. at 730 (quoting Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964)).
221. See id. at 747 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing the fourteenth amendment equal
protection cases of Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Reynolds v, Sims, 377 U.S, 533
(1964)).
222. See Karcher, 462 U.S. at 730.
223. Jd. at 731.
224. Id. at 732.
225. See id.
226. See Karcher, 462 U.S. at 741.
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While the Rodriguez school case in an important sense fails to
come to terms with the substantive problem of obvious, almost palpable
resource inequality at the constitutional level, Karcher focuses on issues
nominally about inequality, but which are in practice trivial, and
unlikely to make even a symbolic difference in ordinary lives. By way
of further contrast, then, let us turn finally to the admittedly unusual
case of Plyler v. Doe.2 27
Plyler involved an equal protection challenge to the denial of free
basic public schooling to undocumented alien children present within
the state of Texas. 8 Without passing judgment on the merits of the
case, or even addressing its complexity,2 9 we can see Plyler as an
example of substantive realism in equal protection adjudication.
The Plyler Court began its analysis with the sort of equal
protection boilerplate that verges on formalism, and which could not
help realistically adjudicate the case of enhanced and unenhanced
groups with diminishing commonalities. In accordance with long-
established precedent, the Plyler Court solemnly insisted that "'all
persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.' '2 30 Whether an
undocumented alien six year old is similarly circumstanced with, say, a
native born six year old of undocumented alien parents is arguably
central to Plyler.
We must come to terms as well with the Court's further
observation in Plyler that "'[t]he Constitution does not require things
which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they
were the same.' ' '231 Just as the Plyler Court had to consider whether the
above six year olds were "different in fact or opinion,, 232 so we must
make an analogous judgment about relevant differences between the
dramatically enhanced and the unenhanced.
Plyler's substantive realism is seen in its ability to take practical
constitutional account of both the value of a basic education and the
likely effects of an uneducated generation of undocumented residents of
227. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
228. See id. at 219-20.
229. For a sampling of the discussions of this case, see Mark Tushnet, Justice Lewis
F. Powell and the Jurisprudence of Centrism, 93 MICH. L. REv. 1854 (1995); Michael J.
Perry, Equal Protection, Judicial Activism, and the Intellectual Agenda of Constitutional
Theory: Reflections On, and Beyond, Plyler v. Doe, 44 U. PITT. L. REv. 329 (1983);
Dennis J. Hutchinson, More Substantive Equal Protection, 1982 Sup. CT. REv. 167.
230. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) (quoting F.S. Royster Guano Co. v.
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412,415 (1920)).
231. Id. (quoting Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940)).
232. Id.
20051
[Vol. 23:1047
Texas. Having denied that education amounts to a fundamental
constitutional right 33 and having rejected any special constitutional
status for undocumented alien children,234 the Court's ruling in favor of
the plaintiffs required an unusually critical and aggressive review of the
state's asserted legitimate interests. But that is not our concern herein.
Instead, we focus on the Court's realistic emphasis, first, on the
practical value of education. Public education, the Plyler Court said, is
not "merely some governmental 'benefit' indistinguishable from other
forms of social welfare legislation." 235  The Court concluded,
supposedly without changing Rodriguez's legal standard, that education
has a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society. We
cannot ignore the significant social costs borne by our Nation when
select groups are denied the means to absorb the values and skills upon
which our social order rests.236
The value of education in this case was assessed by the Plyler
majority not in a social vacuum, but realistically, in the context of "the
specter of a permanent caste of undocumented resident aliens,
encouraged by some to remain here as a source of cheap labor, but...
denied the benefit ... available to citizens and lawful residents.
2 37
Given these practical values and the social context, the Plyler Court
concluded that it was "difficult to conceive of a rational justification for
penalizing these children for their presence within the United States. 2 38
More generally, and by the way of conclusion, it is the decisive
substantive realism of Plyler, rather than the rigorous formalism of
Karcher, let alone the formalistic reductionism of Rodriguez, that
should commend itself in connection with the equal protection problems
posed by classes or castes2 39 of enhanced and unenhanced. There may
well be differences between what is practically important and what is
233. Seeid.at221.
234. See Plyer, 457 U.S. at 219 n.19.
235. Id. at 221.
236. Id. One of the benefits of the broad availability of education, promotion of
advancement on the basis of what is taken to be individual merit, id. at 221-22, may or
may not be of assistance to the future unenhanced.
237. Plyer, 457 U.S. at 218-19.
238. Id. at 220.
239. See supra note 237 and accompanying text. We should emphasize that even if
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constitutionally important.24" But beyond some point, we risk turning
the Constitution into a mere irrelevancy if we constitutionally stray too
far from a focus on what genuinely matters for crucial civic, public,
democratic purposes.
If any number of persons are, through no fault of their own, placed
in a position of realistically insuperable caste-like inferiority,2 4' with the
gulf between groups and their economic productivity increasing over
time, any formalistic approach to equal protection of the enhanced and
unenhanced must at some point trivialize the historically hard-earned
basic meanings of equal protection.242
What equal protection will specifically mean in the context of a
gulf between enhanced and unenhanced persons may, at some precise
level of detail, be left to the future. But generally, the threat of
unbridgeable and severe overall social divisions243 would plainly require
some commensurate legally-enforced redistribution of economic assets
and opportunities in some appropriate and otherwise morally
unobjectionable combination of well-directed taxes, subsidies,
regulations, insurance, and other programs.
Whatever we think of various forms of human enhancement, on
various moral grounds, 4 there is certainly no need to sabotage or
otherwise directly impair any enhanced person for the sake of equal
protection. Equal protection does not require gruesome government
intrusions upon competent persons. 45 Redistribution from, primarily,
240. One could argue, for example, that particularly when read in light of the Fifth
Amendment taking power, the Constitution's Third Amendment reassurances against
the garrisoning of troops in one's home under specified circumstances has over time
faded in its practical significance.
241. See supra section III.
242. See generally JACOBUS TEN BROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW (1965); Slaughter-
House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 37 (1872) ("the main purpose of [amendments 13-15] was the
freedom of the African race, the security and perpetuation of that freedom and their
protection from the oppressions of the white men who had formerly held them in
slavery").
243. See supra Section II.
244. See Michael Sandel, The Case Against Perfection, 291 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 5 1
(April, 2004); JURGEN HABERMAS, THE FuTuRE OF HUMAN NATURE 61 (2003).
Certainly our use of the term 'enhancements' is not meant to prejudge questions of
autonomy, genuine improvement, familial morality, arrogance, hubris, or unwitting self-
degradation.
245. Thus the practical irrelevance, whatever its heuristic value, of Robert Nozick's
thought experiments on equalization through the direct redistribution of actual vital
body parts. See ROBERT NOZtCK, ANARCHY, STATE & UTOPIA 206 (1974). For
discussion, see, e.g., Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L.
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the well-off can certainly take less objectionable forms. And we should
remember that it will often be possible to level up, rather than merely to
level down.
246
Of course, while equal protection is a constitutional right, equal
protection cannot by itself guarantee maximum well-being for those
who are among the least economically well-off. The society that most
fully respects the equal protection of the laws may not be the richest
society. It is possible that respecting the equal protection of the laws
can prevent the poor from becoming in some sense absolutely better off
through sharing, at some modest rate, in the increasingly greater
rewards available to the well off.247 Equal protection cannot always
guarantee efficiency in wealth production such that the poor are always
the best off they could be in absolute terms.
But it is not for nothing that equal protection is enshrined as a basic
constitutional right. It is doubtful that many valued forms of political
and social liberty could meaningfully survive its abandonment.2 48
Certainly our sense of commonality of fate, of constituting a polity in
any genuine sense, requires our taking a substantively realistic approach
to equal protection in the specific context of the various sorts of human
enhancements.
This conclusion does not depend upon exotic speculation about the
possible development of actual subspecies of the human. The need for a
substantively realistic approach to equal protection in the future
enhancements context has much more familiar foundations. As the
English philosopher John Wilson has pointed out, "'[t]reating people as
REv. 359, 447-48 & 447 n.448 (2000); Samuel Scheffler, Prerogatives Without
Restrictions, 6 PHIL. PERSP. 377, 381 (1992) (costs of actual surrender).
246. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKiN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE
OF EQUALITY 440 (2000); Pamela Karlan, Equal Protection, Due Process and the
Stereoscopic Fourteenth Amendment, 33 MCGEORGE L. REv. 473, 491 (2002) (applying
the distinction in the context of the Harper voting rights/poll tax case, 383 U.S. at 670).
247. See the various tradeoffs explored at length in LARRY S. TEMKIN, INEQUALITY
245 (Oxford Univ. Press 1993); DOUGLAS RAE ET AL., INEQUALITIES 129 (1983) (more
broadly, "equality. .. is as well pleased by graveyards as by vineyards"); THE
PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, BEYOND THERAPY: BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE
PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS ch. 6, § (c), available at
http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/beyondtherapy/chapter6.html (10/21/2003); Roger
Crisp, Equality, Priority and Compassion, 113 ETHICS 745, 746 (2003) (discussing the
"leveling down" objection).
248. This is not to suggest that there can never be any tradeoffs between meaningful
equal protection and other basic broadly liberal values. These tradeoffs were a recurring
theme in the work of Sir Isaiah Berlin, on which see the discussions in ISAIAH BERLIN,
LIBERTY 180 n.1, 200-01, 278-79 (Henry Hardy ed., 2002); THE LEGACY OF ISAIAH
BERLIN pt. II, at 73-139 (Mark Lilla et al. eds., 2001).
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equals' is... the description of a skeleton of a particular way of life,
whose flesh is made up of the content of other concepts, in particular
those of fraternity, communication, and love ... as well as for the less
substantial concepts of liberty, democracy, [and] justice. 249
Let us conclude, then, with a brief look at the special and
distinctive problem of equal protection between different generations of
persons in the context of human enhancements. 250 Asking each current
generation to save and invest at a reasonable rate for the sake of future
generations does not generally disturb us, even though we assume that
the future beneficiaries of our present sacrifices will be absolutely better
off than we are. To some degree, we identify with descendants in at
least the next few future generations. We see cultural development as
requiring some investment now that will largely benefit those we hope
will be better off. And we expect future generations to in turn do their
part, even if they can neither help nor hinder us.
How might future human enhancements change this? The writer
Gregory Stock argues that "if germline technology can bring meaningful
enhancement, the greatest divisions will not be between rich and poor
[in any single generation] but between generations.,,211 To a degree, this
has long been true. The creature comforts and medical technology
available to Louis XIV were inferior to those routinely available to
many citizens in advanced contemporary societies. Nor is it clear that
future unenhanced persons will have more in common with their third-
or fourth-generation enhanced contemporaries than those enhanced
contemporaries will have with even later enhanced generations. This
would seem to depend upon the pace of advancement, changes over
time in that pace, cumulative and synergistic effects, the compounding
of advantage, and other current imponderables.
What does seem clear is that if there develops a typically
unbridgeable gulf separating groups of contemporaries, we must adopt a
substantively realistic understanding of equal protection that involves
significant resource and opportunity transfers, mainly from the
privileged to the crucially deprived. To this, the only alternative is an
understanding of the equal protection clause reducing that clause to
meaninglessness, and to a mockery of its historic origins.
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250. For a less narrowly focused discussion, see R. George Wright, The Interests of
Posterity in the Constitutional Scheme, 59 U. CIN. L. REv. 113 (1990).
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OUR FUTURE 144 (2003).
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